Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fa3f69b0ef10ad81…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.02 MB First seen: 2026-05-25
MD5: b3d6fc46b086bd0e46a1cc4ef7221ce9 SHA-1: 1409bc1805b7898b7787a60661b032517ffbbb7e SHA-256: fa3f69b0ef10ad8185f8e6b7b784c78a1fba83ad178c1995b9f2c3d0ea408fa8
380 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, with several heuristics indicating automatic linking and update triggers designed to activate the embedded content. The presence of excessive hex-encoded data within these objects suggests a hidden payload. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic further confirms that the document is designed to prompt the user to enable macros or editing, a common social engineering tactic for malware delivery.

Heuristics 10

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical CVE related RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADER
    RTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage — through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field or the OLE object's own moniker. This is the OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1037KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
🗂 Part of campaign: shared payload 51ef705eef 49 samples

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bad.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBAD 408296 bytes
SHA-256: f7eed903502b22057cdaf12fdbe208a03ceb73608b5d1afaf1ed789391ec220e
objdata_01_off0000735c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x735C 408269 bytes
SHA-256: 92febb63ab2a03bd60957639288d560857f661fa614c3ece96df43e0c90478c9
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): WScript.Shell"")")
objdata_02_off000d692d.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD692D 2632 bytes
SHA-256: 51ef705eef602ac6eb91c2063c8f50d4e54b5e051b60429031d41133bc7df645
objdata_03_off000d7ed0.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD7ED0 12297 bytes
SHA-256: e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7