Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6e52693c6c18b79a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.02 MB
MD5: 9771626e1101d910a266fb0b8321ed43 SHA-1: 62c2a45fc8e36a8aa950992e07463bae741d0b5a SHA-256: 6e52693c6c18b79a07b42a999b4ae9ced53aa630c498d8b2d4513b32f9c91e24
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of malicious OLE object embedding, including composite monikers and automatic updates, strongly suggesting exploitation of CVE-2017-8570. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'click Enable Editing when opening', which is a common lure to bypass macro security. The embedded OLE object data is substantial, indicating it likely hides a payload, such as a script or executable, intended to be dropped and run.

Heuristics 8

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1037KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000966.bin
1ee6f1a59204805ccd203970c28815f62389baf03b3d374e738bc7535fb0e4cb
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x966 408272 bytes
objdata_01_off00007115.bin
47f4f8032e8569f4df700e25243314d73cb82610e2e229c8a008966b681bf214
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7115 408245 bytes
objdata_02_off000d66b4.bin
51ef705eef602ac6eb91c2063c8f50d4e54b5e051b60429031d41133bc7df645
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD66B4 2632 bytes
objdata_03_off000d7c57.bin
e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD7C57 12297 bytes