Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5f815bd7f39cccb4…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.02 MB First seen: 2026-05-24
MD5: 3347d22680185efb3cd73d55b55a5c6d SHA-1: 36f0afde99cdabe38dbe7c281b61c17b1ca41372 SHA-256: 5f815bd7f39cccb4b92bea3d36861d6844eeea3307e86b237d794c660d1305c3
380 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of exploitation, including OLE object data, composite monikers, and automatic linking, strongly suggesting the use of CVE-2017-8570 or CVE-2017-0199. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'click Enable Editing', a common lure to bypass security measures and allow the embedded OLE object to execute, which likely downloads and runs a second-stage payload. The presence of shellcode command strings and suspicious extracted files further supports this attack pattern.

Heuristics 10

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical CVE related RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADER
    RTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage — through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field or the OLE object's own moniker. This is the OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1037KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
🗂 Part of campaign: shared payload 51ef705eef 49 samples

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000966.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x966 408268 bytes
SHA-256: 1f4faf36953f4b3e2353d0e7e7e9ba7a839e824fd994e2e0df2d812e61a073cd
objdata_01_off00007115.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7115 408241 bytes
SHA-256: 921d12f6a43619ab4714d67623c2f9b173877a28f3795ebb6dfd928a498ea4da
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): WScript.Shell"")")
objdata_02_off000d66aa.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD66AA 2632 bytes
SHA-256: 51ef705eef602ac6eb91c2063c8f50d4e54b5e051b60429031d41133bc7df645
objdata_03_off000d7c4d.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD7C4D 12297 bytes
SHA-256: e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7