PDF malware analysis — malicious · e899092e93151afb

MALICIOUS

PDF

94.0 KB Created: 2010-03-27 19:40:43 +04:00 Authoring application: Microsoft® Word 2010 First seen: 2026-05-10

MD5: 5f484830f9d91c232e63e947c87c74c5 SHA-1: 9b64c4200f81c0dab9146f086a1ba21f114d9e34 SHA-256: e899092e93151afb96bacfdf8d9716828d4715dc40d8265a3d751d09b85cc54f

576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a Windows executable payload disguised as a PDF. Critical heuristics indicate a launch action targeting cmd.exe, exploiting CVE-2010-1240 to execute the embedded payload. The embedded file 'Barevner.pdf' is identified as a Windows executable, not a PDF, further confirming the malicious intent to trick the user into opening a malicious file.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 14

Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240

PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED

PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH

PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND

PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\Barevner.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH

An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER

PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS

PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://fontfabrik.comYou In extracted file (stream_002_off000006ef.bin)
- http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspxIn extracted file (stream_002_off000006ef.bin)
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CSPCA.crl0HIn extracted file (stream_002_off000006ef.bin)
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CSPCA.crt0In extracted file (stream_002_off000006ef.bin)
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0HIn extracted file (stream_002_off000006ef.bin)
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0In extracted file (stream_002_off000006ef.bin)
- http://www.microsoft.com/typographyIn extracted file (stream_002_off000006ef.bin)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`Barevner.pdf`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 20 at offset 0x13FAE	27136 bytes
SHA-256: `95ea0b3446866441a1bd9d1d572f3ddd6cb2d2170fd9d1934292436f4e62fcf2`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=Barevner.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, NOP sled, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: LoadLibraryExA, GetProcAddress, ExitProcess
`javascript_obj0021_000.js`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 21 at offset 0x173AA	57 bytes
SHA-256: `37912f45e0dc16a79f991b448580332d0a1d70971afda802255e17d9e4ed98e3`
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script this.exportDataObject({ cName: "Barevner", nLaunch: 0 });
`stream_002_off000006ef.bin`	decompressed-pdf-stream	PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x6EF	171816 bytes
SHA-256: `1f9bda0f357b2943216affe7146442b959e081c45be125d57db32e1b3f146674`

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PDF

Malware Insights

Machine Learning

Heuristics 14

Related samples 8

Extracted artifacts 3