Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4fce5e063830de6b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

470.5 KB Created: 2010-07-08 13:10:41 Authoring application: Microsoft® Office Word 2007 First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 609d3cfac2fa49e031287d19acb7a1c9 SHA-1: 7befab8107fa1f2393dd6400918a6e80d381380b SHA-256: 4fce5e063830de6b5f2e504f2c00e11656e3f1d03a25ff26c423ab39f351f722
616 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. The command then attempts to run an embedded Windows executable, disguised as 'helios.pdf', which is identified as a malicious payload. The embedded executable is likely a second-stage downloader or implant, indicated by the 'Metasploit stager C2' heuristic.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 14

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED
    PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\helios.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.winimage.com/zLibDll In extracted file (helios.pdf)
    • tcp://160.228.74.0:128In extracted file (helios.pdf)
    • tcp://216.229.74.0:128In extracted file (helios.pdf)
    • tcp://172.229.74.0:128In extracted file (helios.pdf)
    • tcp://248.16.75.0:128In extracted file (helios.pdf)
    • tcp://220.19.75.0:128In extracted file (helios.pdf)
    • tcp://236.28.75.0:128In extracted file (helios.pdf)
    • tcp://120.35.75.0:128In extracted file (helios.pdf)
    • tcp://80.18.75.0:128In extracted file (helios.pdf)
    • tcp://76.77.76.0:128In extracted file (helios.pdf)
    • http://ocsp.verisign.com0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00002314.bin)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://fontfabrik.comYouIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00002314.bin)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspxIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00002314.bin)
    • http://crl.verisign.com/ThawteTimestampingCA.crl0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00002314.bin)
    • http://crl.verisign.com/tss-ca.crl0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00002314.bin)
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA2.crl0OIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00002314.bin)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CodeSignPCA2.crt0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00002314.bin)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typographyIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00002314.bin)
🗂 Part of campaign: symcd.com06 24 samples

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
helios.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 29 at offset 0xDE26 950272 bytes
SHA-256: 670ece33b9fc4f60e1d96c01ece9b810c377aa862e585face428f1dba1f3f413
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=helios.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 160.228.74.0:128 (reverse/x86, public); 216.229.74.0:128 (reverse/x86, public); 172.229.74.0:128 (reverse/x86, public); 248.16.75.0:128 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS, SC_STR_SHELLEXEC Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: LoadLibraryW, GetProcAddress, OpenProcess, advapi32.dll, shell32.dll, shlwapi.dll
javascript_obj0030_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 30 at offset 0x75510 55 bytes
SHA-256: c67793a8fda54937a5e34ce8a1ffc0b288351750d5218adb8811a26a057de5c1
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "helios", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off00002314.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2314 88360 bytes
SHA-256: 8c0399762f3a94c30cf014dfcfcb425fc4dd5408f6447a081e57aa3cc66d8ad0

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