Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 adc82f27816a031c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

1.13 MB Created: 2010-06-29 18:43:42 Authoring application: Microsoft® Office Word 2007 First seen: 2026-05-04
MD5: 75ad5cf552010efeac308362c7f7899c SHA-1: cb237382e1755b5bdf8f470621a7ab9674e2bc3c SHA-256: adc82f27816a031c3e9af88ee6f1a9c8b95fbb462012a9b95bef72b30fc2f18f
596 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a critical PDF_LAUNCH heuristic firing, indicating an attempt to execute a command. Specifically, the PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND heuristic shows the execution of 'cmd.exe' with parameters that suggest the exploitation of CVE-2010-1240. This exploit chain likely leads to the execution of an embedded PE payload, as indicated by the PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD heuristic. The ClamAV detection further confirms the malicious nature of the file.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9851

Heuristics 14

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED
    PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\original.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.intern0t.net In PDF document text
    • http://www.ollydbg.de/In PDF document text
    • http://www.chmaas.handshake.de/delphi/freeware/xvi32/xvi32.htmIn PDF document text
    • http://debugger.immunityinc.com/In PDF document text
    • https://forum.immunityinc.com/board/show/0/In PDF document text
    • http://www.uninformed.org/?v=5&a=3&t=pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ocsp.verisign.com0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.monotype.comMonotypeReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://free.avg.com/ww-en/homepageIn PDF document text
    • http://www.offensive-security.comIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://fontfabrik.comYouReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspxReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://crl.verisign.com/ThawteTimestampingCA.crl0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://crl.verisign.com/tss-ca.crl0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA2.crl0OReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CodeSignPCA2.crt0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typographyReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttpReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://www.fonts.comYouReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_timesnewroman.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.htmlReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpaReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://ocsp.verisign.com/ocsp/status0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA.crl0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
🗂 Part of campaign: ollydbg.de 5 samples

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
original.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 340 at offset 0x1057F4 472036 bytes
SHA-256: 777a5260a3ec3bf11cd1b5f58452603be6ae1e8f2489cb4609eb9e6e02a2a53f
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=original.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): powershell.exe
javascript_obj0341_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 341 at offset 0x121E11 57 bytes
SHA-256: 984dc947e3990b672a0fd08a6d6a748764f8ebb7e4ccd5dd4103b775a13e0e89
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "original", nLaunch: 0 });
stream_048_off000a6e66.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xA6E66 138316 bytes
SHA-256: 49167ec59566ad0c4ce724558357f7a21093dd9fe04526e67c3cb0bb56158546
stream_050_off000c3c33.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xC3C33 110336 bytes
SHA-256: ff496edba2e4f2b31a251379d48591a214f2dab58955af2f5cdca4a325a83ff8
stream_052_off000cfc75.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xCFC75 87648 bytes
SHA-256: d550b9a2f7dba00e938834c9a9f744a9b3960b847eb2ac504668188669b181d6

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