Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1e8c589eb508d7da…

MALICIOUS

PDF

94.0 KB Created: 2010-03-27 19:40:43 +04:00 Authoring application: Microsoft® Word 2010
MD5: d75f9787212efeae70a0940b79a08687 SHA-1: 4b9b6378b8f08bf54e58967613caa14d6253b91a SHA-256: 1e8c589eb508d7da1b1b3a9f710580e875a50115bb321587209d412316dbbf21
464 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a launch action that targets cmd.exe, indicating an attempt to execute a secondary payload. Specifically, the PDF leverages CVE-2010-1240 to launch cmd.exe with parameters that likely facilitate the execution of an embedded Windows executable payload, which is masqueraded as 'Barevner.pdf'. The ClamAV detection further confirms the malicious nature of the file.

Heuristics 11

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED
    PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\Barevner.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
Barevner.pdf
6c4e9e9486a931e6eeaa92d1f1cdde1ae45059e2081804220dacf6c22d771c91
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 20 at offset 0x13FAE 27136 bytes
javascript_obj0021_000.js
37912f45e0dc16a79f991b448580332d0a1d70971afda802255e17d9e4ed98e3
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 21 at offset 0x173A6 57 bytes
stream_002_off000006ef.bin
1f9bda0f357b2943216affe7146442b959e081c45be125d57db32e1b3f146674
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x6EF 171816 bytes