MALICIOUS
220
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious File
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
T1137.003 Software Deployment Tools: Windows Management Instrumentation
The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updated objects, which are designed to execute embedded content. High severity heuristics indicate excessive hex data within these objects, suggesting a hidden payload. The presence of a macro/content-enable lure further supports the intent to trick the user into activating the malicious content, likely leading to the download and execution of a second-stage payload.
Heuristics 7
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Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATEDRTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
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Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINKRTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
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\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATERTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
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Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEXRTF contains ~1037KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
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OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATARTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
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Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMBRTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
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Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LUREDocument instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
Extracted artifacts 4
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
objdata_00_off00000bb2.bin4ff8db8c127d3d211a7ba885cca68d0862b10092a8a79c1767222ac295ed2002 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0xBB2 | 408296 bytes |
objdata_01_off00007361.bin026defd18704019c70c39854424774167369985696febe504b1c023905c27c61 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x7361 | 408269 bytes |
objdata_02_off000d6932.bin51ef705eef602ac6eb91c2063c8f50d4e54b5e051b60429031d41133bc7df645 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0xD6932 | 2632 bytes |
objdata_03_off000d7ed5.bine8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0xD7ED5 | 12297 bytes |
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