MALICIOUS
220
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link
T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic
The RTF file contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with high-confidence heuristics indicating automatic linking and update triggers designed to activate the embedded content. The presence of excessive hex-encoded data within these objects suggests a hidden payload. A 'Macro/content-enable lure' heuristic further indicates the document attempts to trick the user into enabling execution, a common technique for malware droppers.
Heuristics 7
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Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATEDRTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
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Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINKRTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
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\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATERTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
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Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEXRTF contains ~1037KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
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OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATARTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
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Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMBRTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
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Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LUREDocument instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
Extracted artifacts 4
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
objdata_00_off00000966.bin904056f2011f00608f1ca7ed58408cdca7b658c471e3602f2685b16217cb328f |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x966 | 408296 bytes |
objdata_01_off00007115.binec3ace85098307c664f224a9f92e41dc08c1a0e33319c7ceb5729fa26fbcc4b0 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x7115 | 408269 bytes |
objdata_02_off000d66e6.bin51ef705eef602ac6eb91c2063c8f50d4e54b5e051b60429031d41133bc7df645 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0xD66E6 | 2632 bytes |
objdata_03_off000d7c89.bine8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0xD7C89 | 12297 bytes |
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