Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d3590dcd37ff946f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

69.3 KB Created: 2020-09-30 12:47:23 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-19
MD5: 0276bac86ab33ffd35d3c2b67a6451a1 SHA-1: 7519c734bd9c143799e34ed886efa4b9ddfa1798 SHA-256: d3590dcd37ff946ff894261d579a865aa7b69a116556649d025fc2e7b3ab6ce8
274 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?keyword=boson+ccna+labs+pdf In PDF document text
    • http://kuleleb.tinahilgers.ca/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740118/725d9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.thecandlewasters.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740804/b86f5ca147.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.choco-latte.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738955/tigikulog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1051c366-d400-45e3-a256-d1044d74634f/18025226167.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/49bc10a2-f9d4-4227-8909-325838211100/91608846866.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f33c2ed5-c056-4b4e-93f5-b98d5f6b6d33/fojowuz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5382/5691/files/79248321004.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/2685/6610/files/ajax_php_post_form.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/8632/1566/files/faduwiji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8969/0773/files/34940676847.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/0460/7139/files/xajav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ff6d84df-b196-4c08-9a25-13e26103809b/23481066754.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3052da0e-362c-4d67-b098-dae1133383a7/suteluruso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d30a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD30A 5244 bytes
SHA-256: 8e0a1fb56e61dc8cbe43f30fa37512eb550a343b624b80bd25962977afb62e4a
font_01_sfnt_off0000e4f4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE4F4 10328 bytes
SHA-256: a1024fba7162658cbde2d61476e56798270bd453aa0786b2c29f56359dd22504