Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 476680dd9cf4d98a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

47.2 KB Created: 2020-09-11 05:39:44 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 07a927d2f2bd87e0130a78af7befd00b SHA-1: b8a47e57ff59a73e50cb403a6a6e42ba70961d8c SHA-256: 476680dd9cf4d98a50d85b8f81cdd8d82ee887388ba1198c9fb6512d448876f6
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: User Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF document contains a lure related to activating Office 2013, consistent with social engineering tactics. Heuristics indicate it links to malicious redirector infrastructure and employs a 'ClickFix' social engineering attack, instructing the user to execute commands via Win+R or a terminal. The primary malicious URL identified is https://ttraff.club/wix?keyword=activador+office+2013+professional+plus, which likely serves as a gateway to further malicious content. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure and heuristics strongly suggest a command execution lure.

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.club/wix?keyword=activador+office+2013+professional+plus
    • http://kidelul.henryrose-id.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738720/6a44b.pdf
    • http://judeg.smbfc.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775734/puzudobexuxoviv.pdf
    • http://pimozixiv.roadwaysport-n-trailer.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874588/xurobevejoja.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/8b97dd_8895b628467a40c985c1d2d43a21b8e0.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/062c90_1f02702dca7f4620be463c471b709294.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/f3cb45_f11a81a401d7483c9cf4e7234eeead1a.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/ee4d88_5987bbf5470c41d39c60f7534b299fd9.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/694d5d_d44f2c160c5f4be2b55088e6be5656f1.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/576447_a09989d9a1894ca5acc0a90a883cd994.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/451461_d89727ad94de4f299735bfcd110fb775.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/d7d6cd_2c2dbea472ea41648c1966e6ab3c9c92.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/913720_ccd7b3641c2745ff87a735066791f214.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/485053_5ce3a9ffd6cf4e91a98e2efb72426011.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/c4f63d_4a0e3a2cabc840218d32a4cde9857b45.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007094.bin
a13fc023ec04d46e9d649a74188129762b7756275f09be70be3016b6f0a1e08f		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7094 5688 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00008418.bin
066a23189ac9d657c54d363d7c7ae27270fd1dfcf57c46df11687251febb09f9		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8418 13996 bytes

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