Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7ad0d6a708b20618…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.9 KB Created: 2020-08-30 07:04:28 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: a94dcdadc68271bc3219cca4146f1d0f SHA-1: b1af3772f0e6e68ed04dd984af06f9f8b191d7d9 SHA-256: 7ad0d6a708b20618ba37ecb9d8b2800536e45f5b1c9ea47a66b5d46c781cbf86
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The PDF file contains a lure, presenting a 'Miracast: not supported by graphics' error message to trick the user into executing a command. This is further supported by heuristics indicating a 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' and 'SE_CLICKFIX' attack, which commonly involve instructing users to paste commands into a terminal. The document also contains a link to a redirector, 'https://ttraff.cc/wix?keyword=miracast%253A+not+supported+by+graphics', which likely leads to a malicious payload.

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wix?keyword=miracast%253A+not+supported+by+graphics
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_e71686ae0bf54d148562e98766d6f469.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/2486b5_35c5fb2466ab4a3f9672f47c728dc0d5.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/9374a7_1b557175f9994b2a8965d7905894bc8f.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/158fb9_1d5bc906c7f14648a834637fd7ec67f2.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/e42ee3_419438a5571942599397768670dace55.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/6924/3549/files/jomumurimobifoteluwuta.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/6779/3817/files/brooklyn_colm_toibin.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/0962/2687/files/strength_of_materials_solved_problems.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/8782/1984/files/59698893111.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/4629/5959/files/windows_10_hardening_script.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7016/8992/files/68951566550.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/1077/6484/files/17521800792.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6827/6384/files/cheddars_erie_pa_menu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/1488/1433/files/perabed.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6761/3087/files/8631623254.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/9983/1968/files/97011925045.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0461/8233/4617/files/nifonobezizonutix.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000653e.bin
6dbec7dbfd846a4d66613e21d75942d05390ae06ec03e62a9d2d99ded7fb3147		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x653E 5600 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007844.bin
c02a37352eb11cf1bfc9b4b7534d34b19b74e870088113e551eedee7ed261854		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7844 10004 bytes

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