Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2ac5578917444878…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.4 KB Created: 2020-10-14 15:32:18 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: e4812f73b9cbc142152a22153b538e26 SHA-1: 61c53eeb1d4187daedb96872569ccca6b7d3da63 SHA-256: 2ac5578917444878285f12fa5fad32db221080fa1d06ce27dba004edc81d536d
234 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document contains numerous links to external PDF files, many of which are hosted on Weebly. It also includes a link to a known malicious redirector. The document body and heuristics indicate a social engineering lure, specifically a 'ClickFix' attack, instructing the user to copy and paste commands into a terminal. This is a common technique to bypass macro restrictions and download a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?keyword=manually+configure+office+365+outlook+2020 In PDF document text
    • https://jatorogerujew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710569/a63fb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fijojonibiw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681787/kizerapu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/divili_dapixi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mojivimimujovo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874437/vepulakanug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/likanutavorolebonat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://guwomenod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873843/roruj-fegedevovelere-zexomojikazi-rewubujelem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://guwomenod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873843/ratot_muweliwamopoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://genigudepa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070712/vovofofaverun_sawivurovoj_nifawubazox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bedizegoresupa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379398/837046.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xojerajap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384359/2122744.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/1460/2401/files/jomitagupitarakadonadop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/9290/8963/files/taromofujonefofejulel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0485/1086/1474/files/5315262816.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/7208/6435/files/piramoziz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0499/4056/2078/files/free_thanksgiving_gif_images.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f0e22752-bfa8-4799-8684-e424161b901d/getutosiwudojo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b69ee133-5d84-48c2-b0af-f821e3a808f0/38780072451.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006bae.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6BAE 5756 bytes
SHA-256: 30a243646d873aa1820f1d43290e2638baa77725c543fb753d95a177c3468ddd
font_01_sfnt_off00007f71.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7F71 10932 bytes
SHA-256: 9802c7a3eaf564621e4f552174720e97070e827a6a9d4b349411442685431432

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