Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d104f6a976c06d4e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

174.8 KB Created: 2010-09-08 11:02:47 -04:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.2) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: d7606cdfb3207f333b94a0b67bdd5fc3 SHA-1: 4e34a06ce6a2ba483de8215704f804932b7acf86 SHA-256: d104f6a976c06d4ea25146c048eaab675da68e6a970b72d5f2925e8a74465279
556 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action for cmd.exe, disguised as a PDF file named 'NATO_Comms.pdf'. This action is designed to execute the embedded payload, likely a second-stage malware. The embedded artifact is detected as a Windows executable by ClamAV, and the overall behavior aligns with a malicious dropper.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\NATO_Comms.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 1 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 174 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (NATO_Comms.pdf)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlUseIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0001ed0a.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/liberation.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0001ed0a.bin)
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
NATO_Comms.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 18 at offset 0x20894 73802 bytes
SHA-256: bb9ad97c19ca558b8028b25419de5f4ec38aed29a501ca2dd47b73a410832dee
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Exploit.Countdown-1
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=NATO_Comms.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0019_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 19 at offset 0x2B745 59 bytes
SHA-256: a5a5cc8555927742caeffff9b2dc16561685280be8969a1c1340feb0a6546aff
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "NATO_Comms", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off0001ed0a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1ED0A 7732 bytes
SHA-256: 1ad63eae222dafb10fdffe638947c75e5242dda549c772733263bf9bb86bf1dd

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.