Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a80576f241544e6f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

87.8 KB Created: 2020-09-03 07:22:23 UTC Authoring application: InvoiceHome.com
MD5: 57e89c28665801cb8448937e05dd89d5 SHA-1: 5a75811a2db79ad2108188a7d1c3377493383f9e SHA-256: a80576f241544e6fbd0a229b4d969f9934a77e8dc26f53b1243e7f639f28bcc6
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1566.001 Stage File Deployment T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol – HTTP T1071.002 Application Layer Protocol – HTTPS T1071.003 Application Layer Protocol – DNS

The file exhibits several indicators of malicious activity, including a PDF exploit chain leveraging CVE-2010-1240, an embedded Windows executable, and a command-line execution attempt. The PDF's launch action, combined with the embedded executable, strongly suggests a drive-by download and execution scenario. The URLs, while benign, are likely used as part of a deception strategy to appear legitimate. The JavaScript code within the PDF stream further supports this, potentially facilitating further exploitation or data exfiltration.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9994

Heuristics 14

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\1002-Contoso.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Generic recovered JavaScript exploit stage high PDF_GENERIC_STAGE_RECOVERY
    Bounded static stage recovery exposed hidden JavaScript through generic transforms such as null-byte collapse, percent decoding, marker replacement, arithmetic character codes, fromCharCode, numeric arrays, numeric-array minus-key decoders, alphabet-index arrays, /Producer half-difference metadata arrays, hex literals, marker-stripped Base64 literals, custom 6-bit XOR table decoders, or repeated-marker hex carriers. This rule is emitted only when the recovered stage contains exploit-like Acrobat JavaScript or shellcode markers.
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 2 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 87 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.agfamonotype.comhttp://www.agfamonotype.com/html/designer/des_index.html
    • http://www.agfgamonotype.com/html/type/license.htmlThis
    • http://www.agfgamonotype.com/html/type/license.htmlNormalNormaaliNormalNorm
    • http://www.zeustech.net/
    • http://]hostname[:port]/path
    • http://www.agfgamonotype.com/html/type/license.htmlNormalNormaaliNormalNorm�lNormaleStandaardNormalNormalnyNormal
    • http://www.monotypeimaging.comhttp://www.monotypeimaging.com/ProductsServices/TypeDesignerShowcaseNOTIFICATION
    • http://www.monotypeimaging.com/html/license.aspx
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://www.apache.org/

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
1002-Contoso.pdf
f436586c9c49e46a759d7fa07853b1d5c54ff6c42133db68bd03c97eef4ea997		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 36 at offset 0xAE75 73802 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0037_000.js
d78cd5b9aa528cab6fd2fd311751f1344fe28967686d87d24e53d38144619b07		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 37 at offset 0x15A86 61 bytes
generic_stage_recovery_000.js
152b7bc7515fb7061c094982fa1333faf8e155f6f2313dce5f398d4f05c5318a		 deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery null-collapse from decompressed stream at 0x2FFE at offset 0x2FFE 26607 bytes
generic_stage_recovery_001.js
3ca38a876190ec30fbfc10da1c062fe53af1ca844cd65d0114e23fff7afe646f		 deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery null-collapse from decompressed stream at 0x2FFE at offset 0x2FFE 26585 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00002ffe.bin
4d065b5f6759c8bf9d8995765b17f2ca97c9c3318b49ce21b9c6a0f1152d4f73		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2FFE 33708 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00008090.bin
eb742e72815c1d81b52ae6179adbeb6a74375e818462e918ab00747c0b4a5e80		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8090 18564 bytes

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