Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a80576f241544e6f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

87.8 KB Created: 2020-09-03 07:22:23 UTC Authoring application: InvoiceHome.com First seen: 2021-07-02
MD5: 57e89c28665801cb8448937e05dd89d5 SHA-1: 5a75811a2db79ad2108188a7d1c3377493383f9e SHA-256: a80576f241544e6fbd0a229b4d969f9934a77e8dc26f53b1243e7f639f28bcc6
596 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF document contains JavaScript that uses the exportDataObject function to drop and launch an embedded executable payload, disguised as '1002-Contoso.pdf'. The 'Launch action' heuristic confirms that cmd.exe is used to execute this payload, likely exploiting CVE-2010-1240. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7, indicating it's a malicious payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9994

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\1002-Contoso.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 2 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 87 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (1002-Contoso.pdf)
    • tcp://172.19.255.48:443In extracted file (1002-Contoso.pdf)
    • http://www.agfamonotype.comhttp://www.agfamonotype.com/html/designer/des_index.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00002ffe.bin)
    • http://www.agfgamonotype.com/html/type/license.htmlThisIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00002ffe.bin)
    • http://www.monotypeimaging.comhttp://www.monotypeimaging.com/ProductsServices/TypeDesignerShowcaseNOTIFICATIONIn extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off00008090.bin)
    • http://www.monotypeimaging.com/html/license.aspxIn extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off00008090.bin)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
1002-Contoso.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 36 at offset 0xAE75 73802 bytes
SHA-256: f436586c9c49e46a759d7fa07853b1d5c54ff6c42133db68bd03c97eef4ea997
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=1002-Contoso.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 172.19.255.48:443 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_REVERSE, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0037_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 37 at offset 0x15A86 61 bytes
SHA-256: d78cd5b9aa528cab6fd2fd311751f1344fe28967686d87d24e53d38144619b07
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "1002-Contoso", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off00002ffe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2FFE 33708 bytes
SHA-256: 4d065b5f6759c8bf9d8995765b17f2ca97c9c3318b49ce21b9c6a0f1152d4f73
font_01_sfnt_off00008090.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8090 18564 bytes
SHA-256: eb742e72815c1d81b52ae6179adbeb6a74375e818462e918ab00747c0b4a5e80

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