Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 36a7a17fc01204b4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

582.5 KB Created: 2008-10-06 18:23:19 Authoring application: Microsoft® Office Word 2007
MD5: 2a7a31b9713881bd8738bc1d12c1acd3 SHA-1: e20eee6eb52fa5e11a9b74a819f65b50a83d5bd1 SHA-256: 36a7a17fc01204b4a889a529bee0c97288b9a8bd2d387e190686b12caac5db6e
466 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a launch action that executes cmd.exe with specific parameters. The critical heuristic 'CVE_2010_1240' indicates exploitation of a known Adobe Reader vulnerability for command execution. Furthermore, an embedded PE payload was detected and flagged by ClamAV as 'Win.Trojan.ShellcodeReverseTcp-1', suggesting the primary purpose is to download and execute a secondary malicious payload. The PDF itself is detected as 'Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586'.

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED
    PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C (if exist "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents\\Access-Through-Access.pdf" (cd "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.wiretrip.net/rfp/txt/rfp9901.txt
    • http://www.webapptest.org/ms-access-sql-injection-cheat-sheet-EN.html
    • http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS04-014.mspx
    • http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/950627.mspx
    • http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2005/Apr/0001.html
    • http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2007/Nov/0235.html
    • http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2008/Feb/0314.html
    • http://support.microsoft.com/kb/925330
    • http://blogs.msdn.com/access/archive/2005/10/13/480870.aspx
    • http://support.microsoft.com/kb/239104
    • http://support.microsoft.com/kb/239482
    • http://support.microsoft.com/kb/294698
    • http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/access/HA012301901033.aspx
    • http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/access/HA101674291033.aspx
    • http://support.microsoft.com/kb/172733
    • http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx/kb/239114
    • http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;EN-US;Q178070
    • http://support.microsoft.com/kb/q147687/
    • http://support.microsoft.com/?id=248738
    • http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyID=7554F536-8C28-4598-9B72-EF94E038C891&displaylang=en
    • http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/access/CH100621381033.aspx
    • http://www.microsoft.com/technet/community/columns/secmvp/sv0907.mspx

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj1969_000.js
4433ed55cf0fb12b0aebaa98afbacf68090cb519ff0342bb56907504f6524dc5		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1969 at offset 0x91424 70 bytes
stream_051_off0008c73c.bin
53dfe79e5e375b522525eaf0f9fd85a6917bed723b4a548610da3415241ebc16		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x8C73C 37888 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.ShellcodeReverseTcp-1
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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