PDF malware analysis — malicious · 36a7a17fc01204b4

MALICIOUS

PDF

582.5 KB Created: 2008-10-06 18:23:19 Authoring application: Microsoft® Office Word 2007 First seen: 2026-05-10

MD5: 2a7a31b9713881bd8738bc1d12c1acd3 SHA-1: e20eee6eb52fa5e11a9b74a819f65b50a83d5bd1 SHA-256: 36a7a17fc01204b4a889a529bee0c97288b9a8bd2d387e190686b12caac5db6e

718 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

This PDF file contains JavaScript that utilizes the exportDataObject function to drop an embedded executable disguised as a PDF. The PDF also contains a launch action that executes cmd.exe, which then renames the dropped executable to Access-Through-Access.exe and executes it. This chain of actions strongly suggests the PDF is a dropper for a malicious executable, likely designed to download and run a further payload.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9950

Heuristics 16

Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240

PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED

PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH

PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND

PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C (if exist "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents\\Access-Through-Access.pdf" (cd "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH

An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER

PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS

PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION

PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
External URI info PDF_URI

PDF contains an external URL action
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://www.wiretrip.net/rfp/txt/rfp9901.txt In PDF document text
- http://www.webapptest.org/ms-access-sql-injection-cheat-sheet-EN.htmlIn PDF document text
- http://ocsp.verisign.com0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
- tcp://192.168.0.2:31337In extracted file (Access-Through-Access.pdf)
- http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS04-014.mspxPDF link annotation
- http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/950627.mspxIn PDF document text
- http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2005/Apr/0001.htmlIn PDF document text
- http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2007/Nov/0235.htmlIn PDF document text
- http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2008/Feb/0314.htmlIn PDF document text
- http://support.microsoft.com/kb/925330In PDF document text
- http://blogs.msdn.com/access/archive/2005/10/13/480870.aspxIn PDF document text
- http://support.microsoft.com/kb/239104In PDF document text
- http://support.microsoft.com/kb/239482In PDF document text
- http://support.microsoft.com/kb/294698In PDF document text
- http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/access/HA012301901033.aspxIn PDF document text
- http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/access/HA101674291033.aspxIn PDF document text
- http://support.microsoft.com/kb/172733In PDF document text
- http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx/kb/239114In PDF document text
- http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;EN-US;Q178070In PDF document text
- http://support.microsoft.com/kb/q147687/In PDF document text
- http://support.microsoft.com/?id=248738In PDF document text
- http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyID=7554F536-8C28-4598-9B72-EF94E038C891&displaylang=enIn PDF document text
- http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/access/CH100621381033.aspxIn PDF document text
- http://www.microsoft.com/technet/community/columns/secmvp/sv0907.mspxIn PDF document text
- http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyID=7554F536-8C28-4598-9B72-In PDF document text
- http://www.microsoft.com/truetype/fonts/wingdings/YouReferenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://crl.verisign.com/ThawteTimestampingCA.crl0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://crl.verisign.com/tss-ca.crl0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA2.crl0OReferenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CodeSignPCA2.crt0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://www.microsoft.com/typographyReferenced by PDF JavaScript
- http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://fontfabrik.comYouIn extracted file (font_02_sfnt_off0003c390.bin)
- http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspxIn extracted file (font_02_sfnt_off0003c390.bin)

Extracted artifacts 13

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`Access-Through-Access.pdf`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 1968 at offset 0x8C73C	37888 bytes
SHA-256: `53dfe79e5e375b522525eaf0f9fd85a6917bed723b4a548610da3415241ebc16`
Detection ClamAV: Win.Trojan.ShellcodeReverseTcp-1 Obfuscation or payload: likely actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=Access-Through-Access.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.0.2:31337 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd
`javascript_obj1969_000.js`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 1969 at offset 0x91424	70 bytes
SHA-256: `4433ed55cf0fb12b0aebaa98afbacf68090cb519ff0342bb56907504f6524dc5`
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script this.exportDataObject({ cName: "Access-Through-Access", nLaunch: 0 });
`javascript_obj-001_001.js`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object -1 at offset 0x62E95	26916 bytes
SHA-256: `d00c3ffe6b65ed51202a9a58dd068de42734343dd8f553e0adacbd65805a0270`
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All Rights Reserved.The Wingdings fonts were designed by Kris Holmes and Charles Bigelow in 1990 and 1991. The fonts were originally named Lucida Icons, Arrows, and Stars to complement the Lucida text font family by the same designers. Renamed, reorganized, and released in 1992 as Microsoft Wingdings, the three fonts provide a harmoniously designed set of icons representing the common components of personal computer systems and the elements of graphical user interfaces. There are icons for PC, monitor, keyboard, mouse, trackball, hard drive, diskette, tape cassette, printer, fax, etc., as well as icons for file folders, documents, mail, mailboxes, windows, clipboard, and wastebasket. In addition, Wingdings includes icons with both traditional and computer significance, such as writing tools and hands, reading glasses, clipping scissors, bell, bomb, check boxes, as well as more traditional images such as weather signs, religious symbols, astrological signs, encircled numerals, a selection of ampersands and interrobangs, plus elegant flowers and flourishes. Pointing and indicating are frequent functions in graphical interfaces, so in addition to a wide selection of pointing hands, the Wingdings fonts also offer arrows in careful gradations of weight and different directions and styles. For variety and impact as bullets, asterisks, and ornaments, Windings also offers a varied set of geometric circles, squares, polygons, targets, and stars.Wingdings Regular: MS: 2006Version 5.00Wingdings-RegularWingdings is either a registered trademark or a trademark of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and/or other countries. Microsoft Typographyhttp://www.microsoft.com/truetype/fonts/wingdings/You may use this font as permitted by the EULA for the product in which this font is included to display and print content. You may only (i) embed this font in content as permitted by the embedding restrictions included in this font; and (ii) temporarily download this font to a printer or other output device to help print content. n o r m a l S t a n d a r d � 2 0 0 6 M i c r o s o f t C o r p o r a t i o n . A l l R i g h t s R e s e r v e d . T h e W i n g d i n g s f o n t s w e r e d e s i g n e d b y K r i s H o l m e s a n d C h a r l e s B i g e l o w i n 1 9 9 0 a n d 1 9 9 1 . T h e f o n t s w e r e o r i g i n a l l y n a m e d L u c i d a I c o n s , A r r o w s , a n d S t a r s t o c o m p l e m e n t t h e L u c i d a t e x t f o n t f a m i l y b y t h e s a m e d e s i g n e r s . 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I n a d d i t i o n , W i n g d i n g s i n c l u d e s i c o n s w i t h b o t h t r a d i t i o n a l a n d c o m p u t e r s i g n i f i c a n c e , s u c h a s w r i t i n g t o o l s a n d h a n d s , r e a d i n g g l a s s e s , c l i p p i n g s c i s s o r s , b e l l , b o m b , c h e c k b o x e s , a s w e l l a s m o r e t r a d i t i o n a l i m a g e s s u c h a s w e a t h e r s i g n s , r e l i g i o u s s y m b o l s , a s t r o l o g i c a l s i g n s , e n c i r c l e d n u m e r a l s , a s e l e c t i o n o f a m p e r s a n d s a n d i n t e r r o b a n g s , p l u s e l e g a n t f l o w e r s a n d f l o u r i s h e s . P o i n t i n g a n d i n d i c a t i n g a r e f r e q u e n t f u n c t i o n s i n g r a p h i c a l i n t e r f a c e s , s o i n a d d i t i o n t o a w i d e s e l e c t i o n o f p o i n t i n g h a n d s , t h e W i n g d i n g s f o n t s a l s o o f f e r a r r o w s i n c a r e f u l g r a d a t i o n s o f w e i g h t a n d d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s a n d s t y l e s . F o r v a r i e t y a n d i m p a c t a s b u l l e t s , a s t e r i s k s , a n d o r n a m e n t s , W i n d i n g s a l s o o f f e r s a v a r i e d s e t o f g e o m e t r i c c i r c l e s , s q u a r e s , p o l y g o n s , t a r g e t s , a n d s t a r s . W i n g d i n g s R e g u l a r : M S : 2 0 0 6 V e r s i o n 5 . 0 0 W i n g d i n g s - R e g u l a r W i n g d i n g s i s e i t h e r a r e g i s t e r e d t r a d e m a r k o r a t r a d e m a r k o f M i c r o s o f t C o r p o r a t i o n i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d / o r o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . M i c r o s o f t T y p o g r a p h y h t t p : / / w w w . m i c r o s o f t . c o m / t r u e t y p e / f o n t s / w i n g d i n g s / Y o u m a y u s e t h i s f o n t a s p e r m i t t e d b y t h e E U L A f o r t h e p r o d u c t i n w h i c h t h i s f o n t i s i n c l u d e d t o d i s p l a y a n d p r i n t c o n t e n t . Y o u m a y o n l y ( i ) e m b e d t h i s f o n t i n c o n t e n t a s p e r m i t t e d b y t h e e m b e d d i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s i n c l u d e d i n t h i s f o n t ; a n d ( i i ) t e m p o r a r i l y d o w n l o a d t h i s f o n t t o a p r i n t e r o r o t h e r o u t p u t d e v i c e t o h e l p p r i n t c o n t e n t . 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U Microsoft Code Signing PCA0� 0 �H�� 0� � �� >P�z��$%�v�!��VNʜ��5y- Ĩ �cɷ��ֱ�� R��ƽ Ũ��k��S �P�d �� Ԃh @xD� 8N�cQ��=��7��c #;q@4G�k�F�'s "�B Q�R�ӣ� � ?q m�!D_B��əd ��4��D�{� /��ߛ! �X1AU8~�X��Yy%��/ ?8x>B �h�~"h �J��xDRG�O��g{� �� }��q<+�f��-�+ 4He�< �� &Ro� �� 0� &0 U % 0 + 0�� U ��0�� [�p�ir�#Q~ �M��ˡr0p1+0) U "Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp.1 0 U Microsoft Corporation1!0 U Microsoft Root Authority� � �<<� �>�c��@0 + �7 0 U %�+K]�rT�� ��S�0 + �7 S u b C A0 U F0 U � 0 �0 + � c�� 4т1>�bE� ��ae�. �8HAϵ�'��VS�� V�H�G$� �z�� z �� ]��X� ̕ӕ�3��^KIP9&: T7�}\ �� aR<� �f�y��Wce� I�z�e��&�� Ƣ��_�p��۫�n �e �� B��&�iz��+��f �� k� ��6� � 8��0>�!�0��b �W��z �^< 7��N Z \��֩��}�x'��n�� 3X�^* 0� 30� � aF�� e0 �H�� 0��1 0 U US1 0 U Washington1 0 U Redmond1 0 U Microsoft Corporation1+0) U "Copyright (c) 2000 Microsoft Corp.1#0! U Microsoft Code Signing PCA0 060404194346Z 071004195346Z0t1 0 U US1 0 U Washington1 0 U Redmond1 0 U Microsoft Corporation1 0 U Microsoft Corporation0� "0 �H�� 0� � ́�8�\��Ы��<� ��]�.]�r��j�ڱ"{ �ȥK�^" ��#��nv��<��Y\?��s3&�b�ay�b�n��n�ǟҤQ va�p�e�� ]��Df��V�@��v$.D0 ��}{� �X ��O Ɉܢ�S�l�cʙj��^LM �/�[[^_R�s-��E � v� ښ�p �M�i�]�k��)Q78��FI �P��h�� qgt�w� �k��_E��q �c �{1�� !�`a�7C=� �� 0� �0 U � �0 U ��k�uS�O� N ��ϔ�0 U % 0 + 0�� U # ��0�� %�+K]�rT��* ��S��t�r0p1+0) U "Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp.1 0 U Microsoft Corporation1!0 U Microsoft Root Authority� j �O� � �� f'�0K U D0B0@�>�<�:http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA2.crl0O + C0A0? + 0 �3http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CodeSignPCA2.crt0 �H�� 8��8�\� ]Tni� ��M�/� T �2��j� �! w>�hz��~�\�Că�e}�PQ\|� ��sע�\� p�&l �R ��̡u��q= �V V��&�^3��%z^�ڦ��A �UF�Hܑ8 X I��1� � �[ e � QС �� %!��W� �[�5��7?�Ck� �E�~��U��H�e�S4�� c xnP�H��CZ�ۭ ��Y�,�� [J�2y�"�� -�P[��@XX��/��m�7y1� �0� � 0��0��1 0 U US1 0 U Washington1 0 U Redmond1 0 U Microsoft Corporation1+0) U "Copyright (c) 2000 Microsoft Corp.1#0! U Microsoft Code Signing PCA aF�� e0 + ��0 + �7( 1 0 �H�� 1 + �7 0 + �7 1 0 + �7 0# �H�� 1 4��i� �O��@+�A��0r + �7 1d0b�8�6 M i c r o s o f t F o n t V e r s i o n 5 . 0 0�&�$http://www.microsoft.com/typography 0 �H�� 08:��Y�=Pi��W �a�� a �#��@V�^xbT��C�tW� � ��Yg� ��qX�Ƥ ��"a� ǎ�� HZ��K��,&Z��$,�o��ݡ�� q �F � A�b�F�� x� �\|��~�f�D��L,�� w��홚��M� On� ?��Q� �% -�o�航P�笌 _y闆�1�~�Ee�B�� [�FU/nT� �~�՞7Ȯ0�`��q��e ��W$��j䆷+}�6Q�j�� ő�� 0� � �H�� 1� �0� � 0g0S1 0 U US1 0 U VeriSign, Inc.1+0) U "VeriSign Time Stamping Services CA �+��)� 2 ^�v�0 �H�� Y0 �H�� 1 �H�� 0 �H�� 1 061002232129Z0 �H�� 1 孥�J :d�x�\p�40 �H�� qd� �� >�D�x-㾥!Z��QE3�k�\|�ܘ��( I��2P��@�IK�� ӥK g�� b?��W�ו 5�9��7 ��_Y�� d4u�w�,�ڏ��j��e��o�Z� �h&զ㱫��= ��O��!� v&R �Z BY�%�u� ��W v�`�� ^ �� ي�<�IEs� ��-h��I! c��Ȏͅ��� DbJ��u��8��U&�� \��Ȑ ��ė��% ��?�
`font_00_sfnt_off000392dc.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x392DC	10680 bytes
SHA-256: `25628f9904a721ac7866a80e711fd4e7cd10b042bd750e1581c32576752ae39f`
`font_01_sfnt_off0003adad.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3ADAD	8848 bytes
SHA-256: `c85a495a80ebc329baa19527fadb11311c7067e248a2143e1c5ca2d1995d59a7`
`font_02_sfnt_off0003c390.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3C390	82460 bytes
SHA-256: `0cf288b1902fe2938bfd2300d823cc443321043d37a063dd86867f87f592cd3d`
`font_03_sfnt_off000469c5.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x469C5	98540 bytes
SHA-256: `dc6aac9f19db3e8f493c970cc850ae3dae378d469d8d0626eefe463a9d8a9097`
`font_04_sfnt_off00052b6d.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x52B6D	83348 bytes
SHA-256: `7c4eda660043104f731df62fb0bb62c1f32daece328d204ae1853acec54fdbfe`
`font_05_sfnt_off0005ca50.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5CA50	56148 bytes
SHA-256: `d5b3b8ddeea9b7050e4035797754dae09e4303f9aa04f2c86a579d99566e5970`
`font_07_sfnt_off00065f03.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x65F03	185904 bytes
SHA-256: `b0613cc902878cef5337c26a798006e456baa361fe0488836dfc0922e8ae5151`
`font_08_sfnt_off00071de4.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x71DE4	42852 bytes
SHA-256: `75ce0a83b8dc4c9235e7138ab6604b69b3f4c417971efb6ab01e2401bf63ef75`
`font_09_sfnt_off0007679e.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7679E	47108 bytes
SHA-256: `fcdcc2c80c53cb47b6452b6bdbf6d4c09951cf284c34e7a8822918ed9d32741d`
`font_10_sfnt_off0007b4ae.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7B4AE	63176 bytes
SHA-256: `87a55369d40e6b2f8902267e77a2d95bc5b0e79446f7c3603bc8ff5f70d024a1`

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Malware Insights

Machine Learning

Heuristics 16

Related samples 8

Extracted artifacts 13