Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 75e40843af3415f9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

27.9 KB Created: 2010-06-19 23:46:31 +02:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.2) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: 90782b5e5aa34702f48d37c90bcce18e SHA-1: 38dde266ca8e75d30d4967bd657702ee553351ee SHA-256: 75e40843af3415f9ff1ea8573147750c1d42e78aecdfcd39e3f4d6d2d4872d8d
536 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the `exportDataObject` function to launch `cmd.exe`. This command then executes an embedded Windows executable, identified as a Trojan (Win.Trojan.Rozena-131), which was disguised with a PDF filename. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\test1.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.ascendercorp.com/http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlUse In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00000136.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/liberation.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00000136.bin)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
test1.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 17 at offset 0x1E40 37888 bytes
SHA-256: f93b6bd1e7d525c5f3a812c9fa108abd3beebff4f009c88cdd2e1bcb9761fbb8
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=test1.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0018_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 18 at offset 0x6B70 54 bytes
SHA-256: 3ec0515f7faa4e200cbc6a13221e52386623a68363dd069a0be5c9cba4b9fdf4
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "test1", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off00000136.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x136 8388 bytes
SHA-256: 1370c33da1d197ffdaafd5b3b5b9f5de657a0a80a72a8e5b1afa87cec2ef78cf

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