Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 48fde1c4b28834b0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

184.0 KB Created: †°HƒŠ?tu·&wš?‹øH]±Ü Authoring application: J¸–Oc¯†\•(s²bx>ßKΊ®Yœ{<HG (via ƒéQEÕÎ.%ö`,ÏJkÔèGT±Âtq"Äôaù=± ¢v) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 8c0df8a748ae8331bfe326e6a22a808c SHA-1: e4a41eb9a28609c2a7cc820cabc2057ce13d88d1 SHA-256: 48fde1c4b28834b04e19cdc23841f4eb7c61d93bdd19b5ca32969a9b76e44978
616 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document leverages a launch action and embedded JavaScript to execute cmd.exe, which then attempts to run a payload disguised as 'glossary.pdf'. The embedded artifact is identified as a Windows executable by ClamAV and static triage, with one signature indicating it's a Rozena trojan. The JavaScript function 'this.exportDataObject' is used to drop and potentially launch the executable, indicating a dropper functionality.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9961

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\glossary.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Encrypted PDF carries /OpenAction — payload hidden from static analysis high PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JS
    PDF declares /Encrypt and also references an executable trigger (/OpenAction). Document encryption hides the JavaScript body and stream contents from static scanners — combined with auto-execution indicators this is a known evasion pattern used to deliver weaponised JavaScript that the analyst cannot inspect without the decryption key.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL tcp://10.10.10.31:443 In extracted file (glossary.pdf)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
glossary.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 38 at offset 0x22EB 37888 bytes
SHA-256: e9a914fe7877acad2d58ad31fbaaf058bb0966311034076f819d5f196815f98f
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=glossary.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 10.10.10.31:443 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0006_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 6 at offset 0x150A 57 bytes
SHA-256: 17bad0fa4b6a9445ca664a304fa336c6c5b9667cb5754e3504b7e359218b2041
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "glossary", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_cff_off0002cf0a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x2CF0A 491 bytes
SHA-256: e822493c4ce473b73ec5c418d7453fe02b7c8d1e41d243e7b21caeba0e5187e4