Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 278f34d235e46b73…

MALICIOUS

PDF

2.40 MB Created: „ -fºøýDil1ñ9Fÿ<\@ Authoring application: þp42>.mV¨J>û:BWÅä (via þp40{mS´A{ï <)
MD5: 584c0839840188a964981c737c394767 SHA-1: 1565e7d61e9bcaa0abb0fa5dbbeccbedc48d67f2 SHA-256: 278f34d235e46b73c2c693619da4f528b6e5817a75a4e6b97a8f01f387144a7f
466 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and an embedded executable file masquerading as a PDF. The critical heuristic PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND indicates that cmd.exe is launched with parameters designed to execute the embedded payload, which is named 'sakerhetspolisen2009webb.pdf'. This chain of actions, combined with the ClamAV detection, strongly suggests a malicious intent to deliver an executable payload to the user.

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\sakerhetspolisen2009webb.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Encrypted PDF carries /JavaScript — payload hidden from static analysis high PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JS
    PDF declares /Encrypt and also references an executable trigger (/JavaScript). Document encryption hides the JavaScript body and stream contents from static scanners — combined with auto-execution indicators this is a known evasion pattern used to deliver weaponised JavaScript that the analyst cannot inspect without the decryption key.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
sakerhetspolisen2009webb.pdf
badd2a812340d36397f643f9125569cbcca1e53f9b3353688dac6f7a6ba48735
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 337 at offset 0x25B6DF 73802 bytes
javascript_obj0338_000.js
7bf228077d558af84b081c12440853cd927f3dc8d9759c19681222218c756fd4
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 338 at offset 0x266343 73 bytes