Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c181aecf60b7ac2e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.3 KB Created: 2010-04-04 11:39:43 +07:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.1) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: c8c922be37e1bf16eed696b495e77c3d SHA-1: 4a2a4ff7ca7fdc23cc4a3090f7a9ab4fa53d19ac SHA-256: c181aecf60b7ac2ec98486af9b4b83082df0f00d7b38c6995ff7ff6d0d66f6b0
596 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document exploits CVE-2010-1240 to execute cmd.exe, which then attempts to launch a payload disguised as a PDF file named 'Laporan_Transaksi_Internet_Banking.pdf'. The embedded JavaScript uses the exportDataObject function to trigger this launch action. The document body and embedded artifact names suggest a lure related to internet banking transactions, aiming to trick the user into executing the malicious payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\Laporan_Transaksi_Internet_Banking.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 2 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 85 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL tcp://10.4.60.100:443 In extracted file (Laporan_Transaksi_Internet_Banking.pdf)
    • http://www.fontfont.dehttp://www.fontfont.deIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000dabc.bin)

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
Laporan_Transaksi_Internet_Banking.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 24 at offset 0x1043D 37888 bytes
SHA-256: 074c638c3984512f8b2d4cd4bdf7573bd7654e58305766e6235426871a3e4cbc
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=Laporan_Transaksi_Internet_Banking.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 10.4.60.100:443 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0025_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 25 at offset 0x150AE 83 bytes
SHA-256: e8eff33a2c0c0acfc34e708fa16b7bcdf307f39898f110a3fe23490d83fa2c9b
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "Laporan_Transaksi_Internet_Banking", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off0000dabc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDABC 5924 bytes
SHA-256: 173016ecdb2c4a0d4c2c697641bc1502bcdf7495265937c733ad97e82bcb8157
font_01_sfnt_off0000ed89.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xED89 5004 bytes
SHA-256: 138eafeebd3809663c196191eb13002d8c327ca5f632d2c0f4cdc1a03e5baeda