Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9c3debad3f667419…

MALICIOUS

PDF

2.20 MB Created: 2010-02-28 18:06:55 Authoring application: Microsoft® Office PowerPoint® 2007
MD5: c24ca24d06a0c47997f27828e9d81fc7 SHA-1: 827924df0e7e7f00a62f89b48532003187731a69 SHA-256: 9c3debad3f667419a6062a13431f3d222f404e1078ff3915f54185aed5ff2c9f
466 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

This PDF file exploits CVE-2010-1240 via a launch action that executes cmd.exe. The command attempts to download and execute a secondary payload, as indicated by the critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND and PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS heuristics. The embedded artifact is detected as Win.Trojan.Rozena-131 by ClamAV, confirming its malicious nature.

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\RCP06-TCP.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-23174 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-23174
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
RCP06-TCP.pdf
f330f3ce745c0f6fa72263213bafe523089c15234886e6ae7ab6bcdd264a710d		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 2454 at offset 0x22E7B2 37888 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj2455_000.js
551f1c223fb4ea79310f4c53e4497726fc4bcaf8bbc5ebce941d24316eaddac1		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 2455 at offset 0x23350D 58 bytes
stream_075_off000e8c36.bin
cf3d013868d81b5a4ece490e9baaa54bc521d1b94cb1a5674178d639a4d7c163		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xE8C36 2724864 bytes

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