Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9c3debad3f667419…

MALICIOUS

PDF

2.20 MB Created: 2010-02-28 18:06:55 Authoring application: Microsoft® Office PowerPoint® 2007 First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: c24ca24d06a0c47997f27828e9d81fc7 SHA-1: 827924df0e7e7f00a62f89b48532003187731a69 SHA-256: 9c3debad3f667419a6062a13431f3d222f404e1078ff3915f54185aed5ff2c9f
518 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

This PDF file exploits CVE-2010-1240 via a launch action that executes cmd.exe. The command attempts to download and execute a secondary payload, as indicated by the critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND and PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS heuristics. The embedded artifact is detected as Win.Trojan.Rozena-131 by ClamAV, confirming its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9765

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-23174 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-23174
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\RCP06-TCP.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ocsp.verisign.com0 Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbersPDF link annotation
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CSPCA.crl0HReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CSPCA.crt0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0HReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typographyReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_symbol.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.htmlReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://crl.verisign.com/ThawteTimestampingCA.crl0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://crl.verisign.com/tss-ca.crl0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA2.crl0OReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CodeSignPCA2.crt0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
🗂 Part of campaign: shared payload 6a59dd3b36 6 samples

Related samples 6

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
RCP06-TCP.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 2454 at offset 0x22E7B2 37888 bytes
SHA-256: f330f3ce745c0f6fa72263213bafe523089c15234886e6ae7ab6bcdd264a710d
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=RCP06-TCP.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj2455_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 2455 at offset 0x23350D 58 bytes
SHA-256: 551f1c223fb4ea79310f4c53e4497726fc4bcaf8bbc5ebce941d24316eaddac1
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "RCP06-TCP", nLaunch: 0 });
stream_075_off000e8c36.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xE8C36 2724864 bytes
SHA-256: cf3d013868d81b5a4ece490e9baaa54bc521d1b94cb1a5674178d639a4d7c163

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