Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6811e4db8a6d8d1d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

347.9 KB Created: 2009-12-01 22:04:33 -03:00 Authoring application: Writer (via BrOffice.org 2.2) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 22892313f2d3f13a38051c6f3fa81c26 SHA-1: 38204689b7ce51414a032122fbeeb59cc7c86a64 SHA-256: 6811e4db8a6d8d1de7ce7be8595ef74b6c6cfee5c9225b059e403c1e8b003d71
558 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains JavaScript that utilizes the `exportDataObject` function to launch `cmd.exe` and execute a command. This command likely attempts to execute the embedded artifact, named 'MapeamentoOR.pdf' but detected as a Windows executable, which is a critical finding. The embedded artifact was also detected by ClamAV as 'Win.Trojan.Rozena-131'. The overall attack pattern suggests a malicious document designed to exploit a PDF vulnerability for initial execution of a payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9975

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\MapeamentoOR.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.submarino.com.br/imports_bio.asp?Query=ProductPage&ProdTypeId=9&ArtistId=3058701&Type=1 In PDF document text
    • tcp://187.41.118.201:4455In extracted file (MapeamentoOR.pdf)
    • http://java.sun.com/blueprints/corej2eepatterns/Patterns/index.htmlPDF link annotation
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://fontfabrik.comYouIn extracted file (stream_201_off0003f0d8.bin)

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
MapeamentoOR.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 498 at offset 0x51F41 37888 bytes
SHA-256: 5eaa2d84025dc4d6c3bdfc95a0fdb1ba78f24ba267d2525ca03fd9b09ea1e86f
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=MapeamentoOR.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 187.41.118.201:4455 (reverse/x86, public) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0499_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 499 at offset 0x56BF6 61 bytes
SHA-256: 6e3de7f362bd4adf3c53647964f6d12f5c0829dc3097a905e62e72e86d993ac6
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "MapeamentoOR", nLaunch: 0 });
stream_201_off0003f0d8.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x3F0D8 37680 bytes
SHA-256: 35883d8e8f4756d6af4868ddee6e51d6b2654c675d7d3bf02e6d6692c390b3fa
font_00_sfnt_off00034dfe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x34DFE 35532 bytes
SHA-256: 04e81858ca8fcf343e85c3a6b114f1a2b55813a6216ea5d423f63cff691b7730
font_01_sfnt_off0003aaff.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3AAFF 28948 bytes
SHA-256: e415a75af9e1f78ee4199d613ab31522059b38c9b2ebc6c4192fa0adb172f51f
font_03_sfnt_off00044223.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x44223 20864 bytes
SHA-256: 8f6f5e5f466f102868ae4d3f5dbeb4d1e4712d7f173a073959a5d736c74edf5f
font_04_sfnt_off00046d1a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x46D1A 28408 bytes
SHA-256: 14f8fe4640cfd87184f2d5dc22475abdc99ba8455ad5472bb448d0d467847381
font_05_sfnt_off0004a800.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4A800 22472 bytes
SHA-256: 3861ed4e55bb7b806b2db4a991fd18c0b4d1a947587e4d627639867e7b5c7e89