PDF malware analysis — malicious · 87470da167d9f94a

MALICIOUS

PDF

411.6 KB Created: 2010-06-11 11:09:09 +08:00

MD5: bdc92ed9b0d412a778c40287ed40bb28 SHA-1: 7195d4c03a951ef7ab079880e4f94edabfa5b663 SHA-256: 87470da167d9f94a8fde405cc21d4c55308df06e1c37942844421f80bf4d018e

360 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a PDF file that contains embedded JavaScript and RichMedia (Flash) content. Critical heuristics indicate exploitation of CVE-2011-0611, a known Adobe Flash Player vulnerability, and a PDF JavaScript exploit cluster. The embedded JavaScript is likely responsible for downloading and executing a secondary payload, a common technique for malware delivery.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.6458

Heuristics 12

Adobe Flash Player RichMedia exploit critical CVE likely CVE_2011_0611_FLASH_RICHMEDIA

PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation with an embedded AS3 SWF loader (ByteArray/loadBytes) and shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static exploit shape associated with CVE-2011-0611 Flash content delivered through Adobe Reader.
JPXDecode + active content — JPEG2000 CVE-family indicator high CVE related PDF_JPX_CVE_2018_4990_RELATED

PDF uses /JPXDecode (JPEG2000) alongside JavaScript, XFA, or RichMedia indicators. This matches the delivery pattern for Adobe Reader JPEG2000 parser exploit families, including CVE-2018-4990, but does not prove the exact malformed JP2/JPX primitive.
PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER

PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA

PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE

unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`stream_002_off00000372.bin` `1a81c36b5f85fc62664f891208ba45856fa01f5c0a77c64e2ce94790ad5a16c4`	decompressed-pdf-stream	PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x372	5080 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`objstm_0015_00.bin` `cbd11d2ce487f41cb2e696adc35306d2f3d38b7de6eab25b0e0d07f05d693f12`	pdf-objstm-decoded	PDF /ObjStm 15 0 obj (inflated)	912 bytes
`objstm_0106_00.bin` `ed50150bcde1f49052b4b14a24bb3b09e2d9afc877eb1497c4764062853371b5`	pdf-objstm-decoded	PDF /ObjStm 106 0 obj (inflated)	333 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00015793.pdf` `4b0e5a330aebd92e39888b8e3023a9175a0a97d8969b949596c8534725f4ae8b`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x15793	333533 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00065683.pdf` `0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x65683	6125 bytes

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