MALICIOUS
196
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
This PDF file exhibits multiple high-severity heuristic firings, including the presence of JavaScript, RichMedia (Flash), and a suspicious secondary embedded PDF. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness. The embedded JavaScript, particularly the use of unescape(), suggests an attempt to obfuscate malicious code, likely for downloading and executing a second-stage payload. The presence of multiple embedded PDFs further indicates a complex delivery mechanism.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9896
Heuristics 8
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Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGEA valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
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RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIAPDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
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unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPEunescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
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JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
Extracted artifacts 7
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
stream_002_off00000372.bin07712ee1dc3f626fbcd02bae2b545a3b13a7b148fd797cec119edd28db067d6a |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x372 | 3386 bytes |
|
Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
|
|||
objstm_0015_00.bincbd11d2ce487f41cb2e696adc35306d2f3d38b7de6eab25b0e0d07f05d693f12 |
pdf-objstm-decoded | PDF /ObjStm 15 0 obj (inflated) | 912 bytes |
font_00_sfnt_off0001b04d.bin2c4b0f1fd3b5e8bff40c8a59a6f1809d3693c44127aa22e95b95663a62f1b92a |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1B04D | 76120 bytes |
font_01_sfnt_off00024f6e.bin1c042371876e105579f838f266a476edc9cb74bd040b5fa71d93fdcfc5197b1b |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x24F6E | 10288 bytes |
font_02_sfnt_off00026600.bin981407950c555be0f67f99a94ac51840656713cfa6c89173236cea5b6aa3b0a0 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x26600 | 42348 bytes |
polyglot_child_pdf_off00017bab.pdf8345e6cec39c08d9b651b66900eec2069f29fa3b5d0d9218ff1a5b80875dad91 |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x17BAB | 84765 bytes |
polyglot_child_pdf_off0002aedb.pdf0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8 |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x2AEDB | 6125 bytes |
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