Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 15

• Adobe Flash Player RichMedia exploit critical CVE likely CVE_2011_0611_FLASH_RICHMEDIA
  PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation with an embedded AS3 SWF loader (ByteArray/loadBytes) and shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static exploit shape associated with CVE-2011-0611 Flash content delivered through Adobe Reader.
• Adobe Flash/authplay SWF exploit in PDF — CVE-2009-1862 critical CVE likely CVE_2009_1862_FLASH_RICHMEDIA
  PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation, an embedded SWF, and PDF-side shellcode heap-spray staging. This matches the 2009 authplay.dll Flash-in-PDF exploit delivery shape even when the SWF bytecode does not expose stable printable Run_Sploit markers.
• Adobe Reader authplay SWF exploit in PDF — CVE-2010-3654 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_3654_FLASH_RICHMEDIA
  PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation, an ActionScript 3 SWF containing DoABC/SymbolClass code with URLRequest or StagePlayer/ByteArray/loadBytes markers, and PDF-side shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static delivery shape associated with CVE-2010-3654 Adobe Reader/Acrobat authplay Flash handling.
• CVE-2010-1297 — Adobe Flash/Reader authplay heap-spray (Flash-in-PDF) critical CVE likely CVE_2010_1297
  PDF embeds a Flash (SWF) object via RichMedia and its JavaScript heap-sprays to groom memory for the embedded Flash exploit. This is the CVE-2010-1297 (authplay.dll) Flash-in-PDF memory-corruption shape; the spray is recovered after de-obfuscating space-padded %u, fromCharCode and \u builders that evade the raw heap-spray rules.
• Flash ActionScript-3 exploit loader in PDF critical CVE related PDF_FLASH_AS3_EXPLOIT_LOADER
  An embedded Flash (SWF) object's ActionScript-3 bytecode contains exploit-loader primitives: decompressing an inner SWF into a ByteArray and executing it via LoaderContext.allowLoadBytesCodeExecution, and/or Vector heap/JIT spray groomers. Benign Flash content does not load and execute code from raw bytes — this is a staged Flash exploit delivered through the document.
• JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
  PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
• Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript heap-spray exploit critical CVE related PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_MULTISTAGE_HEAPSPRAY
  PDF JavaScript hidden behind nested stream filters and/or a custom in-JS decoder (rolling-XOR stager) decodes to a heap-spray / ROP chain. The spray is only visible after unwinding those layers, which is why the raw heap-spray rules miss it. This is an obfuscated multi-stage Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit; the dropped Windows payload (often named Win.Trojan.Agent by signature AV) is the second stage, not the delivery mechanism.
• PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
  PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  Matched line in script

  var st = unescape(urpl("%Zc8d9%Z74d9%Zf424%Zeeba%Zdeec%Z29dc%Z5fc9%Z37b1%Z5731%Z8314%Z1001%Z243c%Z4207%Zdcde%Z55ee%Zdcda%Zecee%Zb881%Zdc4f%Zdcde%Z67ee%Zd09e%Z9c65%Z71c2%Z8465%Z8dd6%Z9965%Z57e2%Zc29a%Zdfa6%Zba1b%Zaa55%Zefce%Zef2b%Za527%Z719f%Z29ed%Z07ed%Z52e1%Ze4ce%Z981c%Z1dd6%Ze125%Z06dd%Z07ae%Ze72f%Z99f1%Z8239%Zb265%Zdffa%Z8a33%Zd055%Z67a5%Zc080%Z31ed%Zd855%Zef65%Z771b%Z0eb7%Zef62%Z6f35%Zd81d%Zec84%Z238d%Z10b9%Zdbe5%Z1f9b%Z8357%Z7512%Z8e8c%Z9b11%Z23da%Z1099%Z8b21%Z7516%Z9cb4%Zec86%Zdcce%Z13ee%Z …

• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
• Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
  A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
• RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
  PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
• Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
  PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
• Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
  The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
• Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text

  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text

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