Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 712159c4f2ff57bf…

MALICIOUS

PDF

190.5 KB Created: 2010-06-11 11:09:09 +08:00 Authoring application: 02-201006全文.doc - Microsoft Word (via Acrobat PDFWriter 5.0Windows NT ª©)
MD5: 7e85b0dd2938a489517efac7cc0363ef SHA-1: f4e137c3623df5b47f651f3842f85ca7c027ce58 SHA-256: 712159c4f2ff57bf82aa33203d8035c5a5eb5f26c80fcdb1d3332b8063319030
320 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains embedded JavaScript and RichMedia (Flash) content that exploits CVE-2011-0611. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload. The presence of multiple PDF-specific exploit heuristics and a high ML classifier score indicate a high likelihood of malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.7362

Heuristics 11

  • Adobe Flash Player RichMedia exploit critical CVE likely CVE_2011_0611_FLASH_RICHMEDIA
    PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation with an embedded AS3 SWF loader (ByteArray/loadBytes) and shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static exploit shape associated with CVE-2011-0611 Flash content delivered through Adobe Reader.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
  • unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE
    unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_002_off00000372.bin
e24018dd38247b45a5f26ae73b583d977efbd82d554c25ac7cb75f450ff96ab6		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x372 3386 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
objstm_0015_00.bin
cbd11d2ce487f41cb2e696adc35306d2f3d38b7de6eab25b0e0d07f05d693f12		 pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 15 0 obj (inflated) 912 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0001799f.pdf
f33eb3ee29f16bdefc21b661b13e7aa7c53197c167159d0d0b386091625f16dd		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x1799F 98371 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0002e1f5.pdf
0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x2E1F5 6125 bytes

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