Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7c3d840dc74fd3cd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

90.8 KB Created: 2008-04-07 11:57:37 -03:00 Authoring application: 376377000P000D000F000C000r000e000a000t000o000r000 000V000e000r000s000i000o000n000 0000000.0009000.0003 (via GPL Ghostscript 8.54) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: d2cdab6466f2163a1abc6f765c0e0c7f SHA-1: 011f1daa461f5e39d62eb297eca14c894477888d SHA-256: 7c3d840dc74fd3cdfaf402b185a7a349529f186b876161eb72564dcd45203fef
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF document contains embedded JavaScript that leverages a launch action to execute cmd.exe. The cmd.exe process is then used to launch a second-stage payload, which is disguised as a PDF file named 'TABELAGT.pdf' but is detected as a Windows executable. This chain of execution indicates a malicious intent to deliver and execute a payload on the victim's system.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\TABELAGT.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL tcp://189.101.53.116:1 In extracted file (TABELAGT.pdf)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
TABELAGT.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 30 at offset 0x11B37 37888 bytes
SHA-256: 5c671dd90bcc118fe3685684a5517a09fb30cdfefafbdd0e3df0ded7212c1f10
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=TABELAGT.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 189.101.53.116:1 (reverse/x86, public) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0031_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 31 at offset 0x167A5 57 bytes
SHA-256: e418aeaa5b043cc1fbb80697dc87fddf812bed2be7ba9de84b81bae79cae6f07
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "TABELAGT", nLaunch: 0 });
stream_002_off00002c79.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x2C79 20336 bytes
SHA-256: 4d612a228a487e2da9ae752413930d3bb4250f9fe1a686458fd4a27094eacb76
stream_003_off00006514.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x6514 31152 bytes
SHA-256: 915aa867d71ce4ba84b50367d54ddc33180c3a67c0edbedd11e38818980304d4
stream_004_off0000bf0f.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xBF0F 28956 bytes
SHA-256: 8862c17cb7bfae41153477da94c8db2d96a1dd661e83fe401d781332a72ad0a1
font_00_sfnt_off000020d2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x20D2 8700 bytes
SHA-256: 22535f18c3fbc94aba1af0b2b2b6de7d9b4a6e32ba52e076690eb8476597f78f

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