Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2bacbdedbf73e1c9…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.02 MB First seen: 2026-05-24
MD5: 60d6c27c63c410e06e7528cb86279d2b SHA-1: 072093a317ac7c6960b2de531ab60ab86d0e29b3 SHA-256: 2bacbdedbf73e1c9ce7a1dfe463873237bfd96270b4ac03991c8899df0c76fe5
380 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, with critical heuristics indicating exploitation of CVE-2017-8570 and CVE-2017-0199/CVE-2017-8759. The presence of ".bin" files within the extracted artifacts, coupled with the OLE2Link remote moniker loader, strongly suggests the document is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The 'Please click Enable Editing to view the document.' text further supports a lure to bypass security controls.

Heuristics 10

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical CVE related RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADER
    RTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage — through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field or the OLE object's own moniker. This is the OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1037KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
🗂 Part of campaign: shared payload 51ef705eef 49 samples

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bad.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBAD 408280 bytes
SHA-256: 6380276f8ba296e45150873b54da5666494edaa270d528b9482a032034c85167
objdata_01_off0000735c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x735C 408253 bytes
SHA-256: daa15554b3e662fe7cd4f9b3e58883c22e8a924b733952b3b94f5192cf9589e5
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): WScript.Shell"")")
objdata_02_off000d690b.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD690B 2632 bytes
SHA-256: 51ef705eef602ac6eb91c2063c8f50d4e54b5e051b60429031d41133bc7df645
objdata_03_off000d7eae.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD7EAE 12297 bytes
SHA-256: e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7