Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 14

• Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
  PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
• TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED
  PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
• ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
• Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
  PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
• Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
  PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
• /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
  PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\12-83-1-PB.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
• Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
  An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
• JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
  PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
  PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
  PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
• Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
  PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://ocsp.verisign.com0 In extracted file (font_04_sfnt_off000a7d3a.bin)

  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CSPCA.crl0HIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0006fc69.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CSPCA.crt0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0006fc69.bin)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0HIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0006fc69.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0006fc69.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typographyIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0006fc69.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://fontfabrik.comYouIn extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off0007c560.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspxIn extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off0007c560.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://www.munchfonts.comYouIn extracted file (font_02_sfnt_off000904a9.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/0In extracted file (font_02_sfnt_off000904a9.bin)
  • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_symbol.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONIn extracted file (font_04_sfnt_off000a7d3a.bin)
  • http://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.htmlIn extracted file (font_04_sfnt_off000a7d3a.bin)
  • http://crl.verisign.com/ThawteTimestampingCA.crl0In extracted file (font_04_sfnt_off000a7d3a.bin)
  • http://crl.verisign.com/tss-ca.crl0In extracted file (font_04_sfnt_off000a7d3a.bin)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA2.crl0OIn extracted file (font_04_sfnt_off000a7d3a.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CodeSignPCA2.crt0In extracted file (font_04_sfnt_off000a7d3a.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://www.fonts.comYouIn extracted file (font_05_sfnt_off000ac318.bin)

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