Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6eea35e947559405…

MALICIOUS

PDF

138.5 KB Created: 2007-11-27 14:35:47 UTC Authoring application: Acrobat Distiller 4.0 for Windows First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 50c6293f7ab5253e48a612ccc5478713 SHA-1: 0159fa3fdc588a7dacd85d708844d10ff2ea4a54 SHA-256: 6eea35e947559405aa9bcfd59d1b1faf1add582e60e700aee88c39dd2c324f2c
538 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains JavaScript that utilizes the exportDataObject function to launch cmd.exe. This command renames an embedded file, declared as a PDF but detected as a Windows executable, to a .exe extension and then executes it. This chain of actions strongly suggests the PDF is a dropper for a malicious executable, likely downloading further payloads from the unknown URL.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C (if exist "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents\\Fraud_Management_in_Auto_Insurance.pdf" (cd "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.arileo.in/mail/logonsys.exe�@�}� In extracted file (Fraud_Management_in_Auto_Insurance.pdf)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
Fraud_Management_in_Auto_Insurance.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 80 at offset 0x1C7AE 37888 bytes
SHA-256: a7f5a0cb5cbc6f19d17a291d644353fab3e33b2fb39e7a5c8b287573a727e0a3
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=Fraud_Management_in_Auto_Insurance.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0081_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 81 at offset 0x21575 83 bytes
SHA-256: 40f49d72d7c44358f9eee6e0fea6b041774755bca68680a73678b8413b46f7dd
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "Fraud_Management_in_Auto_Insurance", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_cff_off00000f41.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xF41 197 bytes
SHA-256: e58def14d8801c466b768e93e38ffb904b5ce50e86fef5fd4d71093b0a10942e
font_01_cff_off0001b4ca.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x1B4CA 197 bytes
SHA-256: 49379d746995c6272857f26a7902407ecb6ee161cd57968efbd002caaa09a2cb
font_02_cff_off0001b6a2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x1B6A2 197 bytes
SHA-256: 2d921a2bd638199271fb1ed955e6a211b67d7f1c97e0f9e9d04d09f3acd8fd76

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