Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2a4900c13e8d1c77…

MALICIOUS

PDF

147.9 KB Created: 2007-11-27 14:35:47 UTC Authoring application: Acrobat Distiller 4.0 for Windows First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: aa87658126270c2a415480393b81dd92 SHA-1: d37267bf8860aaaa2d8858d999df6ac21e4510bf SHA-256: 2a4900c13e8d1c776bb5407ca9dfebb95df935b9bbf6baa3b104f97e2f05df24
598 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. This command is designed to execute a dropped Windows executable, which is disguised as a PDF file named 'Fraud_Management_in_Auto_Insurance.pdf'. The embedded executable payload and the use of a launch action to execute cmd.exe strongly indicate a malicious dropper functionality.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9988

Heuristics 14

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C (if exist "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents\\Fraud_Management_in_Auto_Insurance.pdf" (cd "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • exportDataObject + nLaunch — embedded-file launch-on-open dropper critical PDF_JS_EXPORT_LAUNCH_DROPPER
    PDF JavaScript calls exportDataObject() with nLaunch set, which extracts the document's embedded file and launches it in its default application. This is a launch-on-open dropper: the embedded file is the payload. No benign workflow auto-launches an extracted PDF attachment.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.arileo.in/mail/logonsys.exe�@�}� In extracted file (Fraud_Management_in_Auto_Insurance.pdf)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text

Related samples 1

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
Fraud_Management_in_Auto_Insurance.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 80 at offset 0x1C7AE 37888 bytes
SHA-256: a7f5a0cb5cbc6f19d17a291d644353fab3e33b2fb39e7a5c8b287573a727e0a3
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=Fraud_Management_in_Auto_Insurance.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0081_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 81 at offset 0x21575 83 bytes
SHA-256: 40f49d72d7c44358f9eee6e0fea6b041774755bca68680a73678b8413b46f7dd
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "Fraud_Management_in_Auto_Insurance", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_cff_off00000f41.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xF41 197 bytes
SHA-256: e58def14d8801c466b768e93e38ffb904b5ce50e86fef5fd4d71093b0a10942e
font_01_cff_off0001b4ca.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x1B4CA 197 bytes
SHA-256: 49379d746995c6272857f26a7902407ecb6ee161cd57968efbd002caaa09a2cb
font_02_cff_off0001b6a2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x1B6A2 197 bytes
SHA-256: 2d921a2bd638199271fb1ed955e6a211b67d7f1c97e0f9e9d04d09f3acd8fd76

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.