Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f6374971171fcf37…

MALICIOUS

PDF

90.4 KB First seen: 2026-05-04
MD5: 25cf1364b00af82e3eb86c93d5f98467 SHA-1: 24392ee338a3bf838d1b029f03929114e933a86b SHA-256: f6374971171fcf378ee1f8ee34eceddef3c5917d46bd0a7a87697eeb1f3b30ac
578 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that triggers a launch action, exploiting CVE-2010-1240 to execute cmd.exe. This command is designed to download and execute a Windows executable payload, which is also embedded within the PDF and disguised as a PDF file named 'template.pdf'. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7 and Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\template.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (template.pdf)
    • tcp://192.168.15.4:4444In extracted file (template.pdf)
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
🗂 Part of campaign: shared payload 8b0ebc7b0e 3 samples

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
template.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0x3B5 73802 bytes
SHA-256: cbfcc0c3abe77e06743b9b70bdb69ed2a21a5bb9bb8ee2b6d2dc661d676f3746
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=template.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.15.4:4444 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_REVERSE, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
information.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 12 at offset 0xB5FA 73802 bytes
SHA-256: 151900e967ea316eecc88aec76d3cdb81bb1d5d3df2d552e8b315bdeca6e218d
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=information.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0009_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0xB020 57 bytes
SHA-256: bc1d5cdfa608238e3cd965aa51949d02f8ab713463ea0beb61ec928b121788d1
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "template", nLaunch: 0 });
javascript_obj0013_001.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x1643D 60 bytes
SHA-256: 8b0ebc7b0e1cede4093d4a2cff4236fdef5886d5d613f7cf861aec1ee37ead6b
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "information", nLaunch: 0 });