Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 69d8d32dfc21e053…

MALICIOUS

PDF

130.1 KB Created: 2006-03-06 15:06:33 -05:00 Authoring application: AdobePS5.dll Version 5.2.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 6.0 (Windows))
MD5: 9a4583f899f24a86fe859fc22db728a6 SHA-1: 4a9332c042a6950b30a6bf8a03da8ff1cc1c5a5d SHA-256: 69d8d32dfc21e0531712a67b26fe7eb8365bf59347d7337729323e55597426ad
458 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the exportDataObject function to launch cmd.exe. This command then attempts to execute a Windows executable masquerading as 'blank.pdf'. The critical heuristics indicate a chain of exploitation targeting CVE-2010-1240, leading to the execution of an embedded PE payload. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly support the malicious nature of this file.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\blank.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://www.microsoft.com/exporting
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CSPCA.crl0H
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CSPCA.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0H
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0
    • http://technet.microsoft.com/sysinternals
    • http://www.iec.ch

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
blank.pdf
44961372076a7fdbe041144098502ae17d1983051bbe09fac7aeb651ce7081cf		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 21 at offset 0x2CB1 231288 bytes
javascript_obj0022_000.js
04ad71b0e65251d0c95ec2b499505ab40dc3fd832eac9ff1ab5c5b34b56498f2		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 22 at offset 0x2041A 54 bytes
icc_00_off00000679.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x679 3144 bytes

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