Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 df50ca37d7b2f24d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

175.6 KB Created: 2006-03-06 15:06:33 -05:00 Authoring application: AdobePS5.dll Version 5.2.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 6.0 (Windows)) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 649fc84050627bf5fe7319d11658d11b SHA-1: a587d71a6563b3fce88b7a0f3dae9ebcc9cf4914 SHA-256: df50ca37d7b2f24da9a7287996781244630ce2731c6b96d4ea651d367deb0c1a
538 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

This PDF file exploits CVE-2010-1240 to launch cmd.exe, which then executes a dropped payload. The embedded executable is detected as Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0 by ClamAV. The PDF also contains JavaScript that facilitates the dropping of the executable, which is disguised as 'blank.pdf'. The combination of PDF launch actions, embedded executables, and JavaScript dropper functionality strongly indicates a malicious intent to deliver a secondary payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\blank.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/exportingReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CSPCA.crl0HReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CSPCA.crt0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0HReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://technet.microsoft.com/sysinternalsReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off00000679.icc)
🗂 Part of campaign: usetermassembly 13 samples

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
blank.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 21 at offset 0x2CB1 231288 bytes
SHA-256: 7d547ca690b3c5a44216ac6068acc0539b7b89dc33a3a77d8e3657f243353b19
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=blank.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY, SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0022_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 22 at offset 0x2B9FE 54 bytes
SHA-256: 04ad71b0e65251d0c95ec2b499505ab40dc3fd832eac9ff1ab5c5b34b56498f2
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "blank", nLaunch: 0 });
icc_00_off00000679.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x679 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e

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