Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 00377d2ade0a0200…

MALICIOUS

PDF

110.0 KB Created: 2010-01-01 03:24:00 Authoring application: LaTeX with hyperref package (via pdfTeX-0.14h)
MD5: 5b55699ae1d981beffa4150f5470f764 SHA-1: df73f9f0297b82368d1fe2ecd03123e44e6aa98e SHA-256: 00377d2ade0a020058bd05f259eb43f7623f7139f6e38976b410d77f5940bbbe
458 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1566 Phishing T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

This PDF document exploits CVE-2010-1240 by using a launch action to execute cmd.exe. The embedded JavaScript, specifically the `this.exportDataObject` call, is used to drop and launch a Windows executable disguised as 'hi.pdf'. This indicates a clear attempt to deliver a malicious payload to the user.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\hi.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.hetzner.de

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
hi.pdf
234a5cf87ce2130fa74ddacc7aafe02670b988f8e54c851a4ea421873056a4bb		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 31 at offset 0x283D 375808 bytes
javascript_obj0032_000.js
de4c80896e147f37ea5cec116d371bbcbd998f54e3e8d0c3b46b03088db863e5		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 32 at offset 0x1B3AC 51 bytes

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