Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a03faa7ba319d5f4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

456.4 KB Created: 2007-04-19 01:13:58 UTC Authoring application: FrameMaker 7.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 7.0 (Windows)) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 0faab0e2fd93eb2a7d72317604cd0dfe SHA-1: 62a7a90a0018b2c16c204c5fa37b3fa257ccb670 SHA-256: a03faa7ba319d5f462034ecc504b49feca85ee6232d7a72ed789782f39cc40ba
478 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains a JavaScript object that uses the `exportDataObject` function to extract and launch an embedded executable disguised as 'msexchng.pdf'. This leverages CVE-2010-1240, a known vulnerability allowing arbitrary command execution via PDF launch actions. The embedded executable is likely a second-stage payload, and the JavaScript is responsible for initiating the exploit chain.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9955

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\msexchng.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/SMI/2005/WindowsSettingsReferenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 12

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
High_Quality_Print.joboptions pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 19 at offset 0x290CC 15773 bytes
SHA-256: 92c1099a336b70e5880354bb469740551af654515aa5d5c09de8ad1b8f33cf14
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 13 long base64-like blob(s).
msexchng.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 232 at offset 0x2E630 193536 bytes
SHA-256: fcd06aa466ea22088f908ea42d2b17c88097139f7366b46ad198543b17eb842e
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=msexchng.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: NOP sled, SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: LoadLibraryW, CreateThread
msexchng_1.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 236 at offset 0x50431 193536 bytes
SHA-256: c1d5344bdcc6704ff580cb83700d4f45c006c6ea6b200b238b45e26ab5035bdb
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=msexchng_1.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: NOP sled, SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: LoadLibraryW, CreateThread
javascript_obj0233_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 233 at offset 0x4FE41 57 bytes
SHA-256: 2a3d5036c1de94357ab6f932ff6d7cb2e3ef331b75111f1164c65b6d50f764e6
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "msexchng", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_cff_off0000318d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x318D 338 bytes
SHA-256: 7193c32364a81bf7ddf2cef34b284488e6e35c813b49e565fcfd3f8170d96b0f
font_01_cff_off00003319.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x3319 1223 bytes
SHA-256: 77dc3d77a509c7b019b2241c74470cd4d972a70ca2fcc386d7004ae5d032f5a5
font_02_cff_off000037dc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x37DC 3927 bytes
SHA-256: db89ac3a1e10ee22212b88bc0c15092da75b9062868b7eda6407b7d871c17e4f
font_03_cff_off00004514.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x4514 6624 bytes
SHA-256: 2fdaebfa5e4095201467a640291ec7fd1079f406a4ddcb550159406247bb60d5
font_04_cff_off00005c9a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x5C9A 4844 bytes
SHA-256: 5fe4e8e4f20e0b10c3c528666dfd9a79cbcddbd9e0ffb8a6ad1c49a0c22f5464
font_05_cff_off00024c6e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x24C6E 1588 bytes
SHA-256: 2b96e83bbb44d36713691a43220681312d8a5dcb56a4fb98f5da716c0ffcf696
font_06_cff_off00027e8a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x27E8A 303 bytes
SHA-256: d7838a1a5d6ee07385236cc74221185a7e0ca2d234722066d75a113c87f859e6
font_07_cff_off0002855b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x2855B 3024 bytes
SHA-256: 7fa35482b04df578625e0d0811077c608f3239a5254fb169418f6f5148b6e1e6