Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f109449acbfed7d5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

229.4 KB First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 302b3d5455d5f4194a28139b2e2161fc SHA-1: f59e4a2779415ac046bf40cb16cc1816a3234c52 SHA-256: f109449acbfed7d585f90b5333f51988c03168b3b37f6138932b1904245554a2
442 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample exhibits critical heuristics for process injection (WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread) and execution (CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, GetProcAddress), strongly indicating it attempts to exploit a vulnerability to run arbitrary code. The presence of a NOP sled and slack space anomaly further supports this. The embedded URL is likely used to download a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 11

  • PowerPoint binary-format RCE payload — CVE-2011-1269 / MS11-036 family critical CVE likely PPT_BINARY_MEMORY_CORRUPTION_PAYLOAD
    A macro-free binary PowerPoint (.ppt) document carries a native code payload (embedded PE and/or process-injection shellcode), staged in an oversized binary stream. Legitimate presentations do not embed executables or shellcode; this is the payload half of a PowerPoint memory-corruption exploit (CVE-2011-1269 / MS11-036 family; the same record-overflow delivery is shared with CVE-2010-2572 and CVE-2009-0556).
  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is related Office object-delivery evidence when paired with exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed graphics record required for exact CVE attribution is not proven by this rule alone.
  • Reference to WriteProcessMemory API critical SC_STR_WRITEPROCESSMEMORY
    Reference to WriteProcessMemory API
  • Reference to CreateRemoteThread API critical SC_STR_CREATEREMOTETHREAD
    Reference to CreateRemoteThread API
  • NOP sled detected high SC_NOP_SLED
    Found 20+ consecutive 0x90 bytes
    Disassembly hidden — these bytes score as degenerate, not coherent x86 code (single mnemonic 'nop' is 100% of instructions — a sled or padding/filler run, not program logic).
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 234,888 bytes but its declared streams total only 31,351 bytes — 203,537 bytes (87%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.winimage.com/zLibDll In document text (OLE body)
🗂 Part of campaign: symcd.com06 24 samples

Related samples 3

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