Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3544b8507abdce4c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

228.9 KB
MD5: 2be823033651375b0bf8ab93da6b8236 SHA-1: 8b9cc33ecc60a1c6377ed5dc47a8f4099ae37174 SHA-256: 3544b8507abdce4c2d28497fc2e83bd040a7dca7d9b88b989799800e55372074
340 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1055.012 Process Hollowing

The sample exhibits high-confidence heuristics for process injection techniques, including CreateProcess, VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress. The presence of an embedded URL suggests a downloader or droppper functionality. The OLE slack anomaly and NOP sled further indicate a packed or obfuscated payload. The document body, while in Chinese, appears to be test data related to embedded objects, not a direct lure.

Heuristics 9

  • Reference to WriteProcessMemory API critical SC_STR_WRITEPROCESSMEMORY
    Reference to WriteProcessMemory API
  • Reference to CreateRemoteThread API critical SC_STR_CREATEREMOTETHREAD
    Reference to CreateRemoteThread API
  • NOP sled detected high SC_NOP_SLED
    Found 20+ consecutive 0x90 bytes
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 234,376 bytes but its declared streams total only 31,351 bytes — 203,025 bytes (87%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.winimage.com/zLibDll

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