Office (OLE) malware analysis — malicious · 725fbad23e1f334b

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

411.2 KB First seen: 2026-05-11

MD5: b9df76f437f79900aa2f8f776e9a8222 SHA-1: d3752d8a6737dee26d817fb1875b766c8d60aff4 SHA-256: 725fbad23e1f334b4cf7afd316cbd898b5db896c7b44207729fbf3ffa3397436

442 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample exhibits critical heuristics related to process injection (WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread) and memory allocation (VirtualAlloc), strongly suggesting exploitation of a vulnerability to execute arbitrary code. The presence of a NOP sled and LoadLibrary/GetProcAddress further supports this. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the embedded URL http://www.winimage.com/zLibDll is likely used to download and execute a second-stage payload, indicating a client execution attack pattern.

Heuristics 11

PowerPoint binary-format RCE payload — CVE-2011-1269 / MS11-036 family critical CVE likely PPT_BINARY_MEMORY_CORRUPTION_PAYLOAD

A macro-free binary PowerPoint (.ppt) document carries a native code payload (embedded PE and/or process-injection shellcode), staged in an oversized binary stream. Legitimate presentations do not embed executables or shellcode; this is the payload half of a PowerPoint memory-corruption exploit (CVE-2011-1269 / MS11-036 family; the same record-overflow delivery is shared with CVE-2010-2572 and CVE-2009-0556).
Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT

OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is related Office object-delivery evidence when paired with exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed graphics record required for exact CVE attribution is not proven by this rule alone.
Reference to WriteProcessMemory API critical SC_STR_WRITEPROCESSMEMORY

Reference to WriteProcessMemory API
Reference to CreateRemoteThread API critical SC_STR_CREATEREMOTETHREAD

Reference to CreateRemoteThread API
NOP sled detected high SC_NOP_SLED

Found 20+ consecutive 0x90 bytes

Disassembly hidden — these bytes score as degenerate, not coherent x86 code (single mnemonic 'nop' is 100% of instructions — a sled or padding/filler run, not program logic).
Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS

Reference to CreateProcess API
Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY

Reference to LoadLibrary API
Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS

Reference to GetProcAddress API
OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY

OLE file is 421,118 bytes but its declared streams total only 31,351 bytes — 389,767 bytes (93%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC

Reference to VirtualAlloc API
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://www.winimage.com/zLibDll In document text (OLE body)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/In document text (OLE body)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordmlIn document text (OLE body)

🗂 Part of campaign: symcd.com06 24 samples

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Office (OLE)

Malware Insights

Heuristics 11

Related samples 3