Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 725fbad23e1f334b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

411.2 KB
MD5: b9df76f437f79900aa2f8f776e9a8222 SHA-1: d3752d8a6737dee26d817fb1875b766c8d60aff4 SHA-256: 725fbad23e1f334b4cf7afd316cbd898b5db896c7b44207729fbf3ffa3397436
382 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample exhibits critical heuristics for process injection (WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread) and execution (CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, GetProcAddress), strongly suggesting exploitation of a vulnerability to achieve arbitrary code execution. The presence of an embedded URL, http://www.winimage.com/zLibDll, indicates a likely download location for a secondary payload. The OLE slack anomaly and EMF object further suggest a malformed or intentionally obfuscated structure typical of exploit documents.

Heuristics 10

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is CVE-2007-3893/MS07-046-family evidence when paired with Office exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed EMF record is not proven by this rule alone.
  • Reference to WriteProcessMemory API critical SC_STR_WRITEPROCESSMEMORY
    Reference to WriteProcessMemory API
  • Reference to CreateRemoteThread API critical SC_STR_CREATEREMOTETHREAD
    Reference to CreateRemoteThread API
  • NOP sled detected high SC_NOP_SLED
    Found 20+ consecutive 0x90 bytes
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 421,118 bytes but its declared streams total only 31,351 bytes — 389,767 bytes (93%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.winimage.com/zLibDll
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/

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