Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1ff115d0d4fda6c7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

128.8 KB Created: 2006-01-25 15:14:33 -05:00 Authoring application: PScript5.dll Version 5.2.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 7.0.5 (Windows)) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 1c447ee4773a63a8601ea809c3f72476 SHA-1: 0e38a8617e9f1bb84ca1b91d50d5be486a8978c3 SHA-256: 1ff115d0d4fda6c745b4f58cfe36b2df6de5795b431a557085408b9dbea19efc
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and a critical PDF_LAUNCH heuristic firing indicating a launch action targeting cmd.exe. This action is part of a chain exploiting CVE-2010-1240 to execute an embedded PE payload. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Rozena-131, and the PDF itself was flagged as Pdf.Exploit.Agent-13433. The primary attack vector involves tricking the user into opening the PDF, which then executes the embedded malicious executable.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9994

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-13433 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-13433
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C (if exist "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents\\NASCAR.pdf" (cd "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL tcp://131.191.156.93:4444 In extracted file (NASCAR.pdf)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off00002d1c.icc)
    • https://www.verisign.com/repository/CPS��In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000377f.bin)
    • https://www.verisign.comIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000377f.bin)
    • https://www.verisign.com/repository/verisignlogo.gif0��In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000377f.bin)
    • https://www.verisign.com/CPS0bIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000377f.bin)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/truetype/0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000377f.bin)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
NASCAR.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 48 at offset 0x1B14F 37888 bytes
SHA-256: 615293fcd8adc1fdcd41e9ecb55128dd3387b87253580acd4bcefe5b7d0ce99f
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=NASCAR.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 131.191.156.93:4444 (reverse/x86, public) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0049_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 49 at offset 0x1FE76 55 bytes
SHA-256: 85f12c2179b4b0f60e2640bf572d3a1541edc1680ac81dd52b7080f6fb48f247
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "NASCAR", nLaunch: 0 });
icc_00_off00002d1c.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x2D1C 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e
font_00_sfnt_off0000377f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x377F 11040 bytes
SHA-256: cf65532dba94ec23813c8a3cf964ea89ec446520a187e5ab5d31b61e06ba5461

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