Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 103908e7da4cf2d5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

177.5 KB Created: 2010-06-29 10:30:35 +08:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.2)
MD5: 37386ef683d115ffa1f4eaf4e1a3b2f9 SHA-1: 6f042808029c386ae0eb6fb91ad9d3a5169fe52b SHA-256: 103908e7da4cf2d549df75a395ac1b69303508e863f1549dd64ff5ffc7bd69a8
340 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript that leverages the CVE-2009-4324 vulnerability via the media.newPlayer API. This script is designed to download and execute a secondary payload from the external URI http://www.ngmast.com/. The presence of multiple embedded PDF objects and obfuscated streams further indicates malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9883

Heuristics 12

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
  • unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE
    unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.ngmast.com/
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_002_off00000392.bin
3a8e01b9897e244856a164dc23369c929ec947f9627d75b9483a3c0d984b54c9
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x392 4234 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long hex-escaped blob(s).
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
42c3f4df375ff6f58ff655cc4f88b5cc28f0dd33b978390db3538684a6219b74
deobfuscated-js string-concatenation normalized Acrobat API aliases at offset 0x392 126 bytes
objstm_0017_00.bin
dd7918c182d6e2b8d996a6b8ee81663c49a0cb297efe1e1fa3c5af0c987bde84
pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 17 0 obj (inflated) 871 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00021c52.bin
8d967e3f7adb30bad9975261e43ce1c29118807362792b39ce482d564d9571f9
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x21C52 50420 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0001a6a7.pdf
ec51be0cb0d5d6a7493ef3ca5b698d589ced456e0dca212e9e75f52bffe3d604
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x1A6A7 73605 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0002ae3f.pdf
0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x2AE3F 6125 bytes