PDF malware analysis — malicious · 071422d777d83e5b

MALICIOUS

PDF

155.1 KB Created: 2010-06-29 10:30:35 +08:00 Authoring application: WPS Office 个人版 (via PDFlib 7.0.3 (C++/Win32)) First seen: 2026-05-10

MD5: 7bc8c74eac5b8fe5a08ef33e7e04306d SHA-1: d168e539c78b0db2831ea8b4254c8a74fe12acd5 SHA-256: 071422d777d83e5bc75aaf86fe4c3a94beebb2988c2f226a35110517b33d3872

580 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

Multiple critical heuristics indicate the presence of Flash exploits (CVE-2011-0611, CVE-2009-1862, CVE-2010-3654) embedded within a PDF, targeting Adobe Flash Player. The JavaScript action `media.newPlayer(null);` is used as a loader, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of multiple embedded PDF files and obfuscated streams further suggests a complex exploit chain.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9978

Heuristics 15

Adobe Flash Player RichMedia exploit critical CVE likely CVE_2011_0611_FLASH_RICHMEDIA

PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation with an embedded AS3 SWF loader (ByteArray/loadBytes) and shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static exploit shape associated with CVE-2011-0611 Flash content delivered through Adobe Reader.
Adobe Flash/authplay SWF exploit in PDF — CVE-2009-1862 critical CVE likely CVE_2009_1862_FLASH_RICHMEDIA

PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation, an embedded SWF, and PDF-side shellcode heap-spray staging. This matches the 2009 authplay.dll Flash-in-PDF exploit delivery shape even when the SWF bytecode does not expose stable printable Run_Sploit markers.
Adobe Reader authplay SWF exploit in PDF — CVE-2010-3654 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_3654_FLASH_RICHMEDIA

PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation, an ActionScript 3 SWF containing DoABC/SymbolClass code with URLRequest or StagePlayer/ByteArray/loadBytes markers, and PDF-side shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static delivery shape associated with CVE-2010-3654 Adobe Reader/Acrobat authplay Flash handling.
media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324

PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
Flash ActionScript-3 exploit loader in PDF critical CVE related PDF_FLASH_AS3_EXPLOIT_LOADER

An embedded Flash (SWF) object's ActionScript-3 bytecode contains exploit-loader primitives: decompressing an inner SWF into a ByteArray and executing it via LoaderContext.allowLoadBytesCodeExecution, and/or Vector heap/JIT spray groomers. Benign Flash content does not load and execute code from raw bytes — this is a staged Flash exploit delivered through the document.
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER

PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
Matched line in script
```
 var nop =  unescape("\x25\x750c0c");
```
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA

PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE

PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`stream_002_off00000392.bin`	decompressed-pdf-stream	PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x392	4210 bytes
SHA-256: `95bbb6e5eca65d7784654a6a02aab5672a491d62338daa717c640eec3e81e6a3`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long hex-escaped blob(s).
`legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js`	deobfuscated-js	string-concatenation normalized Acrobat API aliases at offset 0x392	126 bytes
SHA-256: `42c3f4df375ff6f58ff655cc4f88b5cc28f0dd33b978390db3538684a6219b74`
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script media.newPlayer(null); /* AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA */
`objstm_0017_00.bin`	pdf-objstm-decoded	PDF /ObjStm 17 0 obj (inflated)	871 bytes
SHA-256: `dd7918c182d6e2b8d996a6b8ee81663c49a0cb297efe1e1fa3c5af0c987bde84`
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00018a87.pdf`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x18A87	57811 bytes
SHA-256: `44c8ccf075fc9e83481be6af27ed0be1924107f2d24d2afaaff8762339c6595e`
`polyglot_child_pdf_off0002546d.pdf`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x2546D	6125 bytes
SHA-256: `0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8`

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.

PDF

Malware Insights

Machine Learning

Heuristics 15

Related samples 8

Extracted artifacts 5