PDF malware analysis — malicious · 7f70457e8e26b36e

MALICIOUS

PDF

267.6 KB Created: 2010-06-29 10:30:35 +08:00 Authoring application: Acrobat PDFMaker 8.0 for Word (via Acrobat Distiller 8.0.0 (Windows))

MD5: dd6042814a392b85a78848b1f17ec8d4 SHA-1: 42090c521e6949deaf37ec5451a16742f202d926 SHA-256: 7f70457e8e26b36e83f139b29de6829fee8fe914204d6b82bbe37dd0f457f333

398 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript that leverages the `media.newPlayer` function, indicative of the CVE-2009-4324 vulnerability. Additionally, heuristics indicate exploitation of Adobe Flash Player via CVE-2011-0611, suggesting the script's purpose is to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of multiple PDF-specific exploit heuristics and a high ML classifier score further support this assessment.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9593

Heuristics 12

Adobe Flash Player RichMedia exploit critical CVE likely CVE_2011_0611_FLASH_RICHMEDIA

PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation with an embedded AS3 SWF loader (ByteArray/loadBytes) and shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static exploit shape associated with CVE-2011-0611 Flash content delivered through Adobe Reader.
media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324

PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER

PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA

PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE

unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/
- http://www.iec.ch

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`stream_002_off00000392.bin` `827901c0baa14983effafb13a1a38525f6eadc32ea25fc701d7b33eac2dd115d`	decompressed-pdf-stream	PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x392	4147 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long hex-escaped blob(s).
`legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js` `42c3f4df375ff6f58ff655cc4f88b5cc28f0dd33b978390db3538684a6219b74`	deobfuscated-js	string-concatenation normalized Acrobat API aliases at offset 0x392	126 bytes
`objstm_0017_00.bin` `dd7918c182d6e2b8d996a6b8ee81663c49a0cb297efe1e1fa3c5af0c987bde84`	pdf-objstm-decoded	PDF /ObjStm 17 0 obj (inflated)	871 bytes
`icc_00_off000217f3.icc` `2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e`	pdf-icc-profile	PDF ICC profile at offset 0x217F3	3144 bytes
`font_00_sfnt_off000237f1.bin` `9d21e55c9c46660cc83de2bf12ab6142a235d949f86b457e38ff77f70f062b7a`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x237F1	180472 bytes
`font_01_sfnt_off0002acb3.bin` `aa9289dd4f84d3988735ff8f279ea60c259df05293d22fca6cec709bf40227ed`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2ACB3	196068 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off0001f093.pdf` `44c6d1fee5fb8d69fe9ab891ab324d8e479aaecd91b1c9fa4a262964f0eb964f`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x1F093	146930 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00041698.pdf` `0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x41698	6125 bytes

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