PDF malware analysis — malicious · 064a87710ca07a62

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.9 KB Created: 2007-06-22 15:18:31 -07:00 Authoring application: Adobe InDesign CS2 (4.0) (via Adobe PDF Library 7.0) First seen: 2026-05-10

MD5: 3ce42b5092393c2729c91e4f5836b5ec SHA-1: 52a76a5d5e60992e230d28c30e4456f97d62f2f0 SHA-256: 064a87710ca07a625375847c9207827aeeabddf0eeaf1d754b0f9eb0edd1cb7c

556 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the `exportDataObject` function to launch `cmd.exe`. This action is paired with a PDF launch action, exploiting CVE-2010-1240 to execute a payload. The embedded artifact, named 'iphone.pdf', is identified as a Windows executable by ClamAV, indicating a clear attempt to deliver a malicious payload disguised as a document.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9986

Heuristics 12

Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240

PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH

PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND

PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\iphone.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH

An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS

PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`iphone.pdf`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 37 at offset 0xD897	37888 bytes
SHA-256: `35b314cc2d42e2fa22062c62f2097f864a5af97ddbb0b6dcbfee1554588037a9`
Detection ClamAV: Win.Trojan.ShellcodeBindTcp-1 Obfuscation or payload: likely actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=iphone.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd
`javascript_obj0038_000.js`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 38 at offset 0x12644	55 bytes
SHA-256: `0d4492454458d07de5cea4e650faee7f2b11b965db4f2d6c319b1f1fa549aaea`
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script this.exportDataObject({ cName: "iphone", nLaunch: 0 });
`font_00_sfnt_off00002970.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2970	18467 bytes
SHA-256: `bf743b62c1e07e0d0efa5023720978457775a691ed7c9faa976b697f668bccd0`
`font_01_sfnt_off00005465.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5465	12116 bytes
SHA-256: `f21308f923fba6ed15922cc7d2c53dbf85c895894d4cba92031f9fc58ed754c1`
`font_02_sfnt_off00007b1e.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7B1E	10168 bytes
SHA-256: `8bf892c4aab4b9dcabd3834aac0d53bb130c754ab649974f92f7c42a2a28a9f4`

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PDF

Malware Insights

Machine Learning

Heuristics 12

Related samples 8

Extracted artifacts 5