MALICIOUS
438
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1204.002 Malicious File
This PDF file exhibits malicious characteristics, including embedded JavaScript and a critical finding of an embedded PE executable payload. The presence of JavaScript actions and streams, combined with the embedded executable, strongly suggests the document is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The PDF also uses parser-evasion techniques, further indicating malicious intent. The ClamAV detection of 'Heuristics.PDF.ObfuscatedNameObject' reinforces the malicious classification.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9868
Heuristics 13
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ClamAV: Heuristics.PDF.ObfuscatedNameObject critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Heuristics.PDF.ObfuscatedNameObject
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Hex-obfuscated scripting name object critical PDF_OBFUSCATED_NAME_OBJECTA PDF name object that drives script execution (/JavaScript or /JS) is written with #XX hex escapes to hide it from string-based scanners — e.g. /J#61v#61S#63r#69p#74 decoding to /JavaScript. Legitimate PDF producers always write these names literally; hex-encoding an executable name is a deliberate evasion used by exploit-kit and dropper PDFs.
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Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
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Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCHAn /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
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Launch action high PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action with an unresolved or extension-less target — treat as potentially dangerous
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/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JSPDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
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Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASIONPDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
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Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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External URI info PDF_URIPDF contains an external URL action
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.go2pdf.com PDF link annotation
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
nou1.pdf |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 16 at offset 0x1159 | 114688 bytes |
SHA-256: 37121ecb7c1e112b735bd21b0dfe3e526352ecb98c434c5f40e6a2a582380cdd |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=nou1.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file
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javascript_obj0017_000.js |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 17 at offset 0xD7FD | 53 bytes |
SHA-256: 608eca199c721532742bef5fa07c8aa2add996038efe924ab3e67a7653ddc6b3 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "nou1", nLaunch: 0 });
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