Malware Insights
The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the 'exportDataObject' API, indicating an attempt to drop and execute an embedded PE payload. The critical heuristic 'CVE_2010_1240_EMBEDDED_PE_EXPORT' confirms a chain involving Adobe Reader launch and export of an embedded executable. The embedded file 'nou1.pdf' is declared as a PDF but sniffed as a Windows executable, further supporting the malicious intent. The file is also detected by ClamAV as 'Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586'. The launch action targets 'aaa.exe' and includes command-line parameters suggesting execution within the user's environment.
Heuristics 13
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Adobe Reader Launch/export embedded executable chain critical CVE likely CVE_2010_1240_EMBEDDED_PE_EXPORTPDF combines a /Launch action with an embedded-file name tree, exportDataObject JavaScript, and embedded executable bytes. This matches the CVE-2010-1240 Launch-file abuse chain even when the Launch dictionary does not expose the stricter cmd.exe /Win shape.
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Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
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Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCHAn /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
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ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
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Launch action high PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action with an unresolved or extension-less target — treat as potentially dangerous
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/Launch action target: "aaa.exe" high PDF_LAUNCH_COMMANDPDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\nou1.pdf" (cd "Desktop"'.
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/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JSPDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
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Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASIONPDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
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JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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External URI info PDF_URIPDF contains an external URL action
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.go2pdf.com
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
nou1.pdf37121ecb7c1e112b735bd21b0dfe3e526352ecb98c434c5f40e6a2a582380cdd |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 16 at offset 0x1149 | 114688 bytes |
javascript_obj0017_000.js608eca199c721532742bef5fa07c8aa2add996038efe924ab3e67a7653ddc6b3 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 17 at offset 0xD7ED | 53 bytes |
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